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This thesis investigates Chinese foreign aid allocation to Africa between 2000 and 2014. China 
is an emerging donor of foreign aid and has become an alternative source of assistance for 
African recipient countries. Considering the characteristics and history of Chinese activity in 
the region, this thesis focus on answering whether Chinese foreign aid allocation is guided by 
self-interest. Through conventional perspectives on foreign aid, the aim is to scrutinize Chinese 
aid allocation through traditionally expected donor motivations: Recipient need, recipient 
merit, and donor country self-interest. China seems to have an interest in cultivating recipient 
countries with oil endowments, and there are reasons to expect China select oil rich recipients 
with weak institutional capacity that are easier to influence. Using data on Chinese foreign aid 
flows from Dreher et al. (2017)1, the thesis employs a two-step regression analysis to uncover 
whether Chinese foreign aid allocation is guided by self-interest. In addition, the same 
regression models will be tested on foreign flows of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) and the United States to compare the results of Chinese foreign aid. This empirical 
analysis finds that Chinese aid allocation is partly guided by self-interest with a positive 
association to several proxies of recipient country oil abundance. Recipient merit through 
Taiwan recognition is also decisive for receiving Chinese aid, but not for how much in 
monetary amounts allocated. No association between Chinese foreign aid and oil producing 
recipient’s institutional quality is found. However, this thesis does find an association between 





1Data is from Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. 2017. Aid, China, 
and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData Working Paper #46. Williamsburg, VA: 
AidData. Use of the data is the responsibility of the author of this thesis. All potential mistakes or errors in application of the 
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Africa is an extremely aid-dependent region. After centuries of colonialism and western 
extractive policies, the prospects for the development of the region are uncertain. On the one 
hand, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 60 % of the people of the world living in poverty and 
the progress of development is slow. But on the other hand, the continent has a growing young 
population and vast reserves of natural resources. These factors may stimulate growth in the 
long term and lift African societies out of poverty. One way of alleviating these developmental 
issues has been through foreign aid, the transferring of resources from richer countries to poorer 
countries. Aid has been an instrument the west has applied to gradually reduce poverty. For 
several countries in the developing world that are recipients, bilateral aid is a paramount source 
of revenue (Davies and Klasen 2019, 249). Traditionally, the legitimate standards and practices 
of foreign aid allocation have been defined by the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (OECD) and the subsidiary Development Assistance Committee (DAC), mainly 
consisting of western industrialized democracies. The OECD-DAC have set the developmental 
agenda the last decades. In recent years however, aid recipient countries have become 
increasingly disillusioned with this system, which has been perceived as unfair and rigid. 
Furthermore, the loss of legitimacy coincides with the emergence of alternative donor 
countries. The most controversial “new donor” is China (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 
2011, 1951; Dreher et al 2013, 411; Gulrajani and Swiss 2017, 12). The academic interest in 
China as an emerging donor in Africa began in the early 2000s. Several pundits and media 
outlets have increasingly sounded the alarm of China supposedly using foreign aid as an 
instrument for neo-colonial purposes. Many point to Chinas activity in various African 
countries as evidence. China allegedly targets oil rich recipient countries, ignoring their relative 
need or institutional development. Chinese foreign is often accused of being entirely self-
interest based. If Chinese foreign aid is not developmental in intent, how can we understand 
Chinese intentions in Africa? How can we investigate alleged Chinese aid allocation guided by 
self-interested motives? And how appropriate are the applied perspectives on foreign aid 




What is clear is that the Chinese government understands what foreign aid is very differently 
from the West and the OECD-DAC. What is economic activity with developmental intent for 
China can be predatory economic expansion with counterproductive implications in the eyes 
of Western countries (Yushi et al. 2020, 4). Furthermore, China imposes no requirements for 
institutional and democratic reform tied to their aid allocation. This disincentivize poorly 
governed and repressive regimes to democratize or improve institutional quality, as Western 
aid no longer is the only source of assistance (Alden 2005, 154). China also seems interested 
in cultivating good relations with recipients that are oil abundant. For these reasons, Chinese 
intentions are viewed with suspicion. However, the problem is that reading intentions from aid 
allocation is difficult and requires an understanding of the basis in which foreign aid 
traditionally have been disbursed. The debate among scholars on how to systemize aid 
allocation have been ongoing for decades, and the established perspectives were mainly 
modelled on Western aid. And studies analyzing Chinese foreign aid through the perspectives 
of Western standards have only relatively recently become popular (Morgan and Zheng 2019, 
1284). This thesis will attempt to contribute to this respect and focus on how China fits within 
theoretical perspectives based upon Western aid allocation.   
 
Major studies on foreign aid allocation mainly systemize explanations by incorporating several 
schools of thought, and this is perhaps best exemplified by the framework of Berthélemy 
(2006b). When focusing on traditional donors, he sorts the phenomenon into three main schools 
of thought: Recipient need, recipient merit and donor country self-interest. Recipient need 
means that the foreign aid allocation is altruistically distributed to the countries that need it the 
most based on performance of developmental criteria like poverty or health. Recipient merit 
means that foreign aid is allocated to the recipients with “the right policies” in the donors’ eyes. 
This can be good performance on indictors like governance, democracy, or economic policies, 
because foreign aid is perceived to be more effective in sound institutional environments. This 
is usually referred to as aid under conditionalities. The third perspective is donor country self-
interest where foreign aid is allocated opportunistically to so the donor country can reap benefit 
of some determinants. This can be the recipient country’s natural resources, for instance oil 
and minerals, their markets, or their geostrategic positions. Contemporary research on foreign 
aid allocation usually attempts to incorporate assumptions representing several perspectives, 
but many pundits and policymakers tend to assume that China is guided by the last perspective, 
donor country self-interest.  
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Based on such assumptions, this thesis aims to answer if Chinese foreign aid allocation to 
Africa is entirely self-interest based? Furthermore, given that the perspectives on allocation 
summarized are derived from the traditional foreign aid theories, how adequately can Chinese 
foreign aid to Africa be understood aid applied to conventional Western perspectives on 
foreign aid and with the expectations of China as a donor? If the Chinese prime interest in 
Africa is the continents vast natural resources, specifically petroleum endowments, then the 
expectation is that Chinese aid allocation will favor oil abundant countries. But it is hard to 
fully understand the nature of Chinese aid allocation because they understand aid differently 
from the West and the traditional theoretical perspectives might not be the best tools for 
accounting for it. The theme of this thesis does not concern itself with the consequences of 
Chinese foreign aid. It cannot in any definitive way conclude on the intentions of it. But what 
this thesis aims to do is through quantitative empirical analysis deepen our understanding of 
which type of attributes within African countries are associated with Chinese foreign aid 
allocation. In other words, this thesis cannot conclude on what Chinas precise motivations are, 
but it can show which type of countries receive more foreign aid.  
 
Western countries have also disbursed aid based on self-interest. This may partly explain why 
Western aid has lost some appeal while Chinese assistance has gained momentum. And China 
has an apparent symbolic ethos in the developing world. It used to be a very poor country. But 
China has turned from an impoverished agricultural society, plagued by disastrous Maoism and 
unrest, into a major economic power competing with the West. It reaps the fruits from a 
globalized economy while retaining its sovereignty (Alden 2005, 156). The proponents of 
China-Africa partnerships call it South-South cooperation based on noninterference and mutual 
respect. They have also described it as “the poor helping the poor”. Based on this, the Chinese 
foreign aid program operates with the touchstone principle of on non-interference, rejecting the 
Western principle of conditionality. This has led China to support autocracies and repressive 
governments. Having a demand for energy consumption at home, there is also an underlying 
suspicion that China applies its foreign aid as an instrument for access to natural resources like 
oil (Taylor 2006, 940). It has culminated in an accusation that China practices ‘rogue aid’, 
supporting only oil abundant autocracies as an effort to circumvent the western order and 
promote authoritarianism (Naím 2007, 95). While such views lack systematic evidence, they 
nevertheless proliferate in academic, media and policy circles. However, this thesis finds the 
argument that China forms an anti-democracy bloc and actively cultivates autocracy 
unconvincing. This thesis claims that it makes more sense for China to be interested in the 
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functioning of institutions than in democracy in the African recipient countries. If China seeks 
efficient access to petroleum exports, institutions with strong checks and balances would make 
it more difficult to influence oil abundant countries. Democracy hardly seems to be a priority 
for China, with exception of geographically close regimes. The assumption that Chinese aid is 
opportunistically motivated is partly derived from the similar assumption of China being a 
different donor in comparison to Western countries. The Chinese alternative source of 
assistance is framed as a rivaling developmental model to the DAC regime. Therefore, in 
addition, this thesis aims to compare DAC and US aid flows to Chinese aid flows, through 
models with the same recipient determinants. 
 
Through quantitative empirical analysis, this thesis finds that it is not solely self-interest that 
drives Chinese foreign aid allocation. China does in fact have conditionalities for their potential 
recipients: Namely, that they must not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Taiwan 
recognition is a vital factor determining whether recipients get Chinese foreign aid or receive 
nothing at all. But it does not determine how much foreign aid China allocates in monetary 
amounts. There appears to be an association between greater amounts of Chinese aid and 
recipients being efficient in oil production. There is however no finding supporting the 
suspicion that good governance inhibits Chinas interest in oil abundant countries. Although the 
results suggest China allocates less aid to less corrupt countries, control of corruption does not 
seem to have an intervening effect on allocation to countries that are large oil producers. 
Comparatively, the empirical analysis does find that US aid decreases when control of 
corruption is an intervening factor on large-scale oil production.  
 
This thesis looks at Chinese aid to 50 African countries in the period between 2000 and 2014, 
using data from Dreher et al. (2017) that assembled data for Chinese non-reported foreign aid 
flows. The focus of this investigation is based on the self-interest perspective, whether China 
takes advantage of a decrease in DAC aid to fill this vacuum themselves, whether China skews 
their aid to oil abundant recipients, and whether this interest in oil abundance dissipates if the 
recipient is has strong institutions. The finding is that China seems robustly interested in 
countries that are efficient in their oil production and that recognizing Taiwan is a determining 
factor for receiving Chinese aid at all.  
 
This introduction is the first part of this thesis. The second part of this thesis explains the foreign 
aid literature systematized under the three schools of thought: recipient need, recipient merit, 
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and donor self-interest. These conventional perspectives will guide the discussion throughout 
as the text moves forward. The third part aims to contextualize the controversy regarding 
emerging donor countries of foreign aid, as well as the history of China’s evolving foreign aid 
program up till today. Part four discuss the positive and problematic characteristics of Chinese 
foreign aid. There are traits with Chinas allocation approach that is problematic in respect to 
several developing recipient countries. Part three and four provide the sufficient contextual 
understanding of Chinese foreign aid, leading up to the debates and expectations on China as 
a donor country. Part five presents the theoretical expectations on Chinese foreign aid 
allocation. It is in part five that the three hypotheses to be tested are presented. The sixth part 
present the troublesome concept of foreign aid and the even more complicated matter with 
interpreting Chinese foreign aid. Part seven sets forth the data on Chinese aid from Dreher et 
al. (2017) and the explanatory variables representing the schools of thought on foreign aid 
allocation. Part eighth discusses the methodology and the two-step model applied. The first 
step in this solution is a linear probability model for a binary variable of Chinese aid. The 
second step models analyze Chinese aid in monetary amounts using pooled, random, and fixed 
effects. The ninth part displays the empirical results through the two-step approach, as well as 
several robustness tests and the final models, that compare US and DAC aid. The tenth and 




2. Schools of thought on foreign aid allocation 
Generally, the origins and development of the form of foreign aid known today are usually 
traced to the aftermath of the second World War, as the United Nations was established, and 
massive rebuilding projects ensued. (Arvin and Lew 2015, 1). A complex and cooperative 
system defining the rules of the game in foreign aid, technically called ‘development 
assistance’, have gradually emerged. In general, established democracies and industrial 
economies are donors of aid. developing countries, many of them in Africa, are the recipients 
of foreign aid. It has been quite the variation in ways to map out donor’s allocation 
characteristics while also attempting to understand donor intents. Scholars have for decades 
vehemently disagreed which models are best suited and which assumptions most accurate. In 
regard to foreign aid allocation, models would apply assumptions with allocation based on 
donor self-interest or based on recipient need, but gradually, the models incorporating variables 
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combining several schools of thought became popular. They were called “hybrid” models. 
Hybrid models are statistical models including variables from all the schools of thought: 
allocation from political motives, strategic, commercial, and humanitarian. “Hybrid models” 
does a better job counteracting and dealing with omitted variable bias (Berthélemy 2006a, 179; 
McGillivray and White 1993, 4) when important explanatory variables are ignored and left out, 
obscuring the actual effect. There are three established schools for thought and ways to model 
donor behavior that have been proved practical to use in research studying foreign aid. 
Contemporary studies on the subject typically integrate models with consideration to the 
relative need for aid of the developing country, or the attributes with said country that the donor 
country find to be strategically important for its self-interest (Kolstad, Wiig and Williams 2008, 
17). There are usually three perspectives that dominate the literature on what intents determine 
the allocation of foreign aid: First there is recipient need, the relative need a developing country 
or recipient has that necessitates that the donor direct its foreign aid flows to this country. 
Second, we have recipient merit, the perceived “worthiness” of the recipient in form of the 
right policies in the eyes of the donor country which by the DAC this has typically been 
understood as good governance. Thirdly and finally, there is the donor country self-interest 
perspective where the donor country allocates aid based on economic returns or strategic 
interests ahead of relative need or good policies of the recipient (Berthélemy 2006b, 78; 
Hoeffler and Outram 2011, 241). 
 
2.1. Recipient need – aid by altruism 
Recipient need is allocation based on how much the receiving country needs the aid, and the 
expectation is that the aid flows target the neediest countries. Recipient need is commonly also 
understood as developmental motives for aid. In this case, purpose of aid is poverty alleviation, 
meaning that foreign aid is only to be allocated to countries where aid is believed to improve 
developmental conditions (Berthélemy 2006a, 184). According to Maizels and Nissanke the 
recipient need model is mostly based on the assumptions that each country receives aid 
proportional to its economic needs and that the developing country is poor because it lags way 
behind in terms of domestic resources and foreign exchange availabilities (Maizels and 
Nissanke 1984, 881-882). The recipient need-models only contain economic and social 
determinants of the recipient country because the central assumption is that humanitarian 
considerations are the primary motivation for the allocation of foreign aid and that the flows 
should allocated in the most equitable way to the poorest countries. The amount of aid should 
then be allocated in proportion to the recipient country’s relative need (McGillivray and White 
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1993, 11). Also called the ‘idealist paradigm’, the primary motivation is to reduce poverty and 
promote economic development in the recipient countries, more so than self-interest 
(Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 298). Donors will themselves posit that they will provide 
aid in order to help the recipient help themselves and to become self-reliant in the long-term 
(Yushi et al. 2020, 7). The logic on early foreign aid was that the development assistance that 
the United States committed to the European states would promote and reinvigorate them to 
economic growth and eventually into becoming potential aid providers themselves. The 
purpose of the aid industry was therefore to assist developing countries to become self-
sustaining and prosperous, so that they themselves could be donor countries eventually, like 
several European recipients had become by the late 1900s (Gulrajani and Swiss 2019, 353). 
While the OECD-DAC aid structure has claimed to do this for several years, others expect 
different allocation trends. Critics note that, even though official development assistance is 
supposed to alleviate poverty, generate development, and promote democracy, empirical 
evidence suggests that the western donors like the United States are not entirely altruistic 
themselves (Kragelund 2008, 579; Lee 2019, 574). Such research suggests that self-interest 
trumps need. 
 
Foreign aid programs will commonly be presented by donor governments as exclusively 
motivated by recipient need, even though altruism might not be the actual motivation. 
Morgenthau (1962) believed that the only legitimate kind of financial grants from one country 
to another, apart from military and humanitarian aid, was financial assistance promoting 
economic development. Morgenthau also believed this justification of developmental aid 
rested on the assumption that economic development could be improved through transfers of 
money (Morgenthau 1962, 302). Some expect that the non-DAC donors like China should be 
better on recipient need because they recently have been recipients themselves and know what 
works and what doesn’t (Dreher et al. 2013, 404; Taylor 2006, 940). And China has claimed 
to better represent the global south in contrast to the OECD-DAC, with a new well-working 
flexible model based on equal partnerships, increased trade and investment, and sharing of 
technical expertise (Dreher et al. 2011, 1951; de Renzio and Seifert 2014, 1865). The idealized 
view inherent in the recipient need model has been under scrutiny for a long time because the 
amounts of aid poor counties have received has not corresponded to their actual socioeconomic 
need, and the eventual established consensus is that the donor countries have substantial 
leverage over its recipient countries (McKinlay and Little 1977, 59). Maizels and Nissanke, in 
their influential contributions to the aid literature, have outright rejected the recipient need 
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model for explaining bilateral aid allocation for the DAC members and found other 
perspectives like commercial interests more convincing (1984, 883). Their explanation for the 
perspectives low explanatory power is that different donor countries might have different aid 
allocation criteria. What does exemplify the foreign aid from the DAC countries, however, is 
aid disbursements that are conditional on fulfilling some criteria. It is also lack of such criteria 
that critics say defines Chinese foreign aid allocation.  
 
2.2. Recipient merit – aid by compliance to conditionalities 
The second perspective is recipient merit, which postulate that aid allocation goes to the 
countries with better policies, particularly with regards to good governance, institutional 
quality, trade openness, and democracy. DAC donors traditionally require conditions for 
foreign aid. This either take the form of demand for support in political or economic matters; 
or conditions that the recipient improve their policies in governance, democracy or human 
rights that OECD considers to be vital in order to reduce poverty (Dreher et al. 2011, 1951).  
 
Consensus among academics and policy makers is that the recipient countries institutions and 
good governance are decisive for sustainable growth and poverty reduction. Institutions is 
conventionally defined as legal rules and norms that are robust, properly enforced, and rational-
legally administered by a bureaucracy. These views also tend to promote for the recipient 
countries economic systems open to investment and trade (Dollar and Levin 2006, 2036). 
Western assumptions like this often entail the narrative that underdevelopment is due to 
nonfriendly economic systems and lack of technological know-how. Assuming this is true, then 
financial aid is supposedly what these environments need. According to Morgenthau, the 
established consensus has been that what boosted economic development for the west was 
capital formation and incentives for technical innovation, and the logic that follows this model 
should work for underdeveloped countries today as well (Morgenthau 1962, 304-305).  
 
There have been instances of European-American institutional norms and frameworks being 
exported and successfully emulated elsewhere, exemplified by Japan during its modernization 
period during 19th century. This real or imagined success formula had a brief resurgence during 
the 1990s (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, 98). In recipient countries, the challenges of corruption and 
poor governance as a curb on development gained more attention during the assuaging end of 
cold war. Regimes opened and democratization movements in the developing world made these 
issues safer to put on the agenda (Cremer 2008, 5). On the part of the donor countries, the 
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problem was never actually taken seriously until the World Bank started to conduct thorough 
research on the matter. It coincided with the western euphoria after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
and a following uncritical belief in the international community’s power as an external force 
to influence regimes by applying and exporting Western governance principles. Instruments 
and models to fight corruption and promote good governance were refined and adopted and 
sought implemented by the major donors. But even though the understandings of the 
institutional sources of corruption became more sophisticated, the solutions implemented was 
neoliberal and Anglo-American one-size-fits all models assumed universally applicable 
(Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, 98). Therefore, a practice gradually emerged where development 
assistance allocation was earmarked with conditions guided by such principles. Recipients 
showing merit in this regard are considered not only countries with the correct policies, but 
also safe and predicable economic environments.  
 
The concept of merit, what is here understood as “conditionality”, is often assessed in terms of 
benchmarks under quality of institutions, government, and economic policies in line with the 
Washington consensus. According to this logic, only the countries accomplishing these 
benchmarks and goals are eligible to receiving DAC development assistance because aid 
supposedly has better effects the better the institutional environment (Dreher et al. 2013, 405). 
With OECD-DAC this usually means good governance or anti-corruption measures (Hoeffler 
and Outram 2011, 241). 
The idea that the effectiveness of foreign aid is dependent on the quality of institutions in the 
recipient country can be traced back to empirical evidence as far back as the success of the 
Marshall Plan (Dollar and Levin 2006, 2035). But while the Marshall plan is a success story, 
the recipients then were industrialized countries and institutionally well-working systems 
incapacitated by the Second World War. Whereas the current recipients of aid are 
underdeveloped and primary export oriented. They lack this institutional baseline (Morgenthau 
1962, 304). By requiring prerequisites of institutional reform before the commitment of aid, 
like supporting establishment of anti-corruption commissions and audit agencies (Kolstad, 
Wiig and Williams 2008, 26), the donor incentivizes the recipient governments to improve 
governance and democracy if they wish to receive financial assistance. Conditionality, what Li 
define as “the exercise of leverage by donors who attach conditions of democratic governance 
to the disbursement of aid” have by its proponents been argued as the most important 




Good institutions and good governance are important factors for the provision and 
effectiveness of development assistance because they demonstrate that the recipient country 
uses the financial resources wisely, in for example infrastructure and education, and signals to 
the donor that their foreign aid is not wasted. However, countries with good institutions, some 
argue, are in less need of such assistance because their performance suggests they have access 
to international capital markets and poverty is less concentrated in such middle-income 
countries (Dollar and Levin 2006, 2036). This could raise a selection problem of whether 
foreign aid is best allocated to countries with good governance or the poorest ones where the 
need for financial assistance is the greatest. More positively viewed; conditionality solves 
principal-agent problems if the preference of the recipient government is not in line with the 
benchmarks deemed necessary by the donor country. Nevertheless, it forces the recipients to 
reform if government need foreign aid. It can also be useful to the recipient country in the long 
term because it signals that it is a stable and predictable policy environment with a regime 
willing to reform, a government safe to establish diplomatic connections with; and given time 
a safe place to invest in (Li 2017, 203). One could also make the argument that there’s an 
overlapping aspect with recipient need, in that ensuring good institutions, good governance, 
and civilian and democratic elected government prevents a country from spiraling into 
authoritarianism and chaos. This is akin to what Morgenthau called “subsistence foreign aid”, 
that is development assistance intended to prevent breakdown of government or sustain the 
status quo, especially if the alternative regime is unacceptable (Morgenthau 1962, 302). The 
World Bank have for example terminated aid projects in countries like Sudan, Nigeria, and DR 
Congo as a reaction to rising corruption levels (Cremer 2008, 122). However, there is some 
debate if even the OECD donors actually does reward good governance or if it is only rhetoric, 
as several corrupt countries have received DAC development assistance (Dreher et al. 2011, 
1951).  
 
The concept of conditionality is central when discussing Chinese aid, because an important 
critique is that China on the face of it does not apply conditionalities in their foreign aid 
program. Instead of promoting principles of institutional reform, China earmarks their aid for 
infrastructure projects like railways, roads, hospitals, water irrigation, and power and 
electricity, or with conditions that Chinese workers build the projects or that Chinese 
companies are the main implementers (Yushi et al. 2020, 5). China imposes no clear demands 
for potential recipients, with one exception of its One China Policy.  
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China does require that the recipient government honor the conditionality in not recognizing 
Taiwan as an independent entity from China. This is known as the One China Policy. China 
considers Taiwan a breakaway province and any formal diplomatic recognition of the island as 
an independent state is unacceptable. But apart from the One China policy, there are no 
demands for good governance, democracy or human rights for bilateral cooperation (Alden 
2005, 153; Tull 2006, 463). One would expect a difference between Chinese and Western 
allocation in this respect because of Chinas non-interference policy and Western conditionality 
principles when allocating foreign aid. 
 
2.3. Donor self-interest – aid by opportunism 
Donor country self-interest is a third school of thought. Also called “realist paradigm”, this 
theoretical perspective became popular in the cold war era. In the aid literature, foreign aid 
allocation is recognized as a tool a powerful country can apply to advance their interest, even 
if it comes at the expense of the official altruistic motivation of improving impoverished areas. 
It assumes that the primary motivation a donor country has for allocation of foreign aid always 
is with strategic self-interest in mind (McKinlay and Little 1977, 61; Markovtis, Strange and 
Tingley 2019, 588; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 297). During the height of the Cold War, 
it became apparent that donor countries, exemplified by the two superpowers the United States 
and the Soviet Union, used their foreign aid programs opportunistically in order to advance 
their own geopolitical interest, while the perceived need of the recipient countries took a 
backseat (Broich 2017, 182; McKinlay and Little 1977, 59). Historically, it has also been a 
common feature of geopolitics and diplomacy. In international relations, it is an observance of 
recognizing concessional gifts between states as an old expression of alliance, reciprocity, way 
of forging long-lasting political relationships (Markovtis, Strange and Tingley 2019, 594). It 
was during 1970s the phenomenon received a surge in scholarly attention. A lot of research has 
concluded that donor country self-interest is the most important factor, even to such an extent 
where it could undermine developmental goals (Hoeffler and Outram 2011, 237).  
 
The self-interest models assume donors allocate foreign aid based on the recipient’s economic, 
political, and strategic importance to the donor in question. The assumption is that foreign aid 
is merely an instrument for the powerful donor country to exert its foreign policy influence. It 
is therefore aid motivated on the basis of self-interest (McGillivray and White 1993, 11). 
Beyond explaining self-interest from the military alliance perspective, the so called neorealists 
started to incorporate the recipient’s economic potential into their models when explaining why 
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a donor would benefit from allocating foreign aid to developing countries (Schraeder, Hook 
and Taylor 1998, 298). Aid can be used to open economic markets in the recipient country for 
enterprises in the donor country. It implies economic interest on the part of the donor country 
towards the recipient country because it enables firms’ access to the markets in the recipient 
country (Markovtis, Strange and Tingley 2019, 590; Yushi et al. 2020, 7). If the case where 
one assumes the donor country was to “maximize the developmental returns” from their foreign 
aid disbursements, the assumption further would be that they also would favor countries with 
a better economic performance where the donor country can “absorb” the returns (Maizels and 
Nissanke 1984, 884; McGillivray and White 1993, 7).  
 
Self-interest is linked to varieties of goals the donor might have. From one perspective, foreign 
aid can have a positive influence on the favorability of the donor country from the recipient 
countries point of view. Foreign aid buys a lot of goodwill, and the donor country will allocate 
aid towards the countries with the more similar policies or similar positions. Foreign aid can 
also be a tool for a donor country to improve its own geopolitical position (Berthélemy 2006a, 
183). There is now a consensus that all donors of development assistance, DAC and non-DAC, 
also allocate foreign aid motivated by their strategic self-interest, for example to stimulate and 
promote bilateral trade between the countries and/or reward their political allies. Quite a few 
studies have found support for this argument (Dreher et al. 2013, 405; McKinlay and Little 
1977, 59; Morgan 2018, 210). Donors would want to strengthen their economic security by 
providing development assistance to the stronger economies (or potential future stronger 
economies) in a region. One understanding posit that foreign aid is supposed to improve the 
economic situation of the donor country by promoting trade and investment with the recipient 
country (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 304). 
Strengthening economic partnership, energy security, and stimulation of trade relations are 
often cited motivations for non-DAC donors as well. China has often been deemed the “chief 
villain” of non-altruistic donors only motivated by self-interest (Dreher et al. 2013, 405). But 
a lot of the earlier research in the ‘aid allocation’-literature has found quite a lot of the variation 
in this regard. It has typically been found that major powers like The United States favor oil-
rich countries in the Middle East; Japan favors commercial interests for access to markets; 
France has sometimes prioritized their former colonies; while the Nordic donors have been 
more inclined to allocate flows based on recipient need like poverty (Kolstad, Wiig and 
Williams 2008, 17; Kragelund 2008, 577). Criticism of the West during the Cold War was 
generally that the priority was on skewed on stabilizing governments favorable to the 
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American-led order as opposed to the Soviet Union, and these geopolitical priorities trumped 
the meritocratic considerations like human rights and institutional development and recipient 
need like poverty (Dunning 2004, 412).  
 
 
3. China – among emerging donors 
These three preceding perspectives have recurred in several studies on foreign aid allocation 
for the past twenty-five years. It is only recently that emerging donors have been seriously 
investigated in this respect. This gap exists because they have not been legitimately considered 
traditional donors of foreign aid and because data more often than not is lacking. Part of the 
legitimacy of the DAC system is transparency of disbursements, that all donors report their 
developmental assistance in accordance with the standards agreed upon (Gulrajani and Swiss 
2019, 355). These standards do not apply to emerging donor countries for the most part, 
however. The reactions emerging donors of foreign aid have received from western actors has 
been confrontational. They are often viewed with suspicion and condemnation by traditional 
donors, being perceived as circumventing the efforts of the current Western development 
assistance regime. But among the recipient countries, their reputation is often much better. 
There are reasons why the emerging donors are ascendant and have increasingly gained 
legitimacy over the years.  
 
3.1. Emerging donors lack of political conditionalities 
As mentioned, the DAC foreign aid regime is characterized by conditionalities for aid. 
Recipients therefore need to reform and improve their institutions in order to be eligible for 
assistance. What sets emerging donors apart is that they impose no such standards and are 
therefore viewed as ignorant of the conditionalities purpose. According to some authors and 
governments, emerging donors deliberately target autocratic, oil rich client states with gross 
records on human rights, accountability, democracy, and good governance (Broich 2017, 182). 
This is what the conventional literature claims, not necessarily what is the truth. Nonetheless, 
the concern of DAC is that conditionalities as an incentive dissipate if there is an alternative 
source of foreign aid with no strings attached. The cost for a recipient country of receiving aid 
from an emerging donor is much lower for an autocracy or poorly governed state when there 




Several studies have found that conditionality worked after the Cold War after ideological 
motivations for foreign aid disappeared (Li 2017, 202). Dunning (2004) that found foreign aid 
with conditionalities was effective only during the early post-Cold War years. Major donors 
would not risk the cost of losing important political relationships, even if the recipients were 
autocratic and repressive, because these clients might otherwise get closer to competing donors. 
In the short period after the Cold War the relationship between development assistance and 
democracy in Africa was positive (Dunning 2004, 410). The positive effect of conditionalities 
was therefore period-dependent in that no rivaling geopolitical donors offered separate viable 
alternatives for a source of assistance, in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet 
Union. Li (2017) found that aid with tied conditionalities to Africa only works when African 
countries does not have an alternative source of aid. When alternative sources of assistance are 
not tied to demands for reform, the effects the OECD desires for good governance and 
democracy does not appear to bear fruit. In other words, conditionality does not appear to work 
when there are alternative sources of aid with no strings attached available (Li 2017, 217). But 
decades after the Cold War, there are today alternative sources of foreign aid from several 
emerging donors that are less rigid than the DAC programs. 
 
Countries categorized as emerging donors are non-DAC members and usually include Russia, 
India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Emerging donors are often 
accused of attempting to circumvent the DAC development assistance regime. But when this 
system was established by the OECD, these “new” donors’ countries were not invited to 
stipulate and define the playing field. Circumvention for some might therefore be enabled 
industrializing countries exercising foreign policy for others. But the donor that has sparked 
most concern is China. The Chinese foreign aid program imposes no conditionalities of 
institutional or democratic improvement and is guided by a principle of non-interference. By 
emphasizing non-interference, the Chinese might have created a different demand for foreign 
for recipient countries that want sovereignty from external conditionalities, and who resent 
fiscal transparency doctrines the OECD have required for decades (Tan-Mullins, Mohan and 
Power 2010, 876). And while the DAC in recent years have put increased emphasis social and 
institutional infrastructure, emerging donors like China have been more engaged towards 
physical infrastructure like improvement of roads and railways and technical improvement of 
the production sectors in the developing countries (Dreher et al 2013, 408). They therefore fill 
important gaps left out by the DAC donors and implementation of projects are less hindered 
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by bureaucratic red tape. This alternative aid regime has by several recipients been perceived 
as more efficient. The problematic consequences present themselves when this the alternative 
source of foreign aid does not require any conditionalities or incentives for reform. Simply the 
possibility of receiving Chinese foreign aid as an alternative to Western aid, associated with 
administratively costly reforms, is by this understanding detrimental for the incentives to 
improve governance and democracy in developing countries (Li 2017, 202). 
From some African countries’ perspectives, China is a reliable donor country that will not 
interfere in their internal affairs (Mohan and Power 2008, 31). 
 
3.2. Frustration with the DAC regime  
But why have DAC conditionalities become unpopular while the supply of alternative sources 
of aid have risen? The rise of new donor countries can be partly attributed to the waning 
legitimacy of the contemporary foreign aid regime, spearheaded by OECD-DAC regime. The 
system of development assistance has since the turn of the millennium been lamented for being 
far too complex, rigidly bureaucratic, overtly fragmented, and hampered by coordination 
problems between bilateral and multilateral donors (Kragelund 2008, 556). There have been 
warning signs of growing disillusionment toward the traditional donor countries and 
particularly the aid for conditionality system. For instance, improving institutional quality as a 
condition has been criticized. One-size fits all solutions based on vague Western standards of 
“deviation from the norm” in order to solve developmental issues like corruption are rarely 
adjusted to the specific political and cultural context (Cremer 2008, 58; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, 
208). State and informal institutions are “sticky”, they are hard to change, and often 
institutional reform combating corruption has proved trickier in the private sector than in 
government (Kolstad, Wiig and Williams 2008, 23). Central actors might not have any 
incentive for institutional rules to change. If costly reforms imposed do not work, then 
conditionalities can be perceived as counterproductive to the purposes of development. 
 
Frustratingly, DAC donor counties have also shifted priorities on which type of conditionalities 
they impose. They promoted fiscal adjustment and stabilization programs in the 1980s but 
changed towards institutional building in the 1990s (Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010, 
860; Woods 2008, 1217). Developing countries are often required to continuously show 
measurable results. Many recipients resent the conditionality principles of the west as rigid and 
view them as infringements of their sovereignty. The OECD doctrines have been criticized for 
of having a Washington consensus baseline that paternalistically dictate how developing 
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countries should govern (Dreher et al. 2011, 1951). Academics have also commented. Paul 
Collier insisted that conditionalities only worsen governance and accountability because the 
transfer of sovereignty, and by implication responsibility, does not incentivize the governments 
in their own terms to develop political processes that reward compliance and punish 
nonconformity with institutional rules (Collier 1999, 319). Conditionalities, from the deeply 
critical view, deny African countries agency and self-determination. In addition, the evidence 
that DAC conditionality actually fulfills its predicted effects of improved democracy and 
institutions are mixed. Some evidence also suggests their implementation of the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was more rosy rhetoric than actual improvement (Dreher et 
al 2013, 410). 
 
Rising skepticism in Africa to the traditional DAC aid is associated with weariness of such 
rigid conditionalities resulting in slow bureaucratic processes pre-aid commitment. From this 
perspective, the attractiveness of alternative emerging donor offers makes sense. The DAC 
inability to adapt accordingly have exacerbated this disillusionment (Woods 2008, 1220). 
Furthermore, evidence also suggest that traditional donors have allocated aid based on strategic 
self-interest as well. They are guilty of the exact same opportunism emerging donors are 
accused of. During the Cold War, western donors’ allocation even largely resembles the 
allocation of emerging donors. It was self-interest-based skewed towards the infrastructure and 
natural resource procurement sectors (Kragelund 2008, 579; Martuscelli 2020, 298). Even 
though emerging donors are deemed to have changed the aid game, the presence of alternative 
donors of foreign aid is nothing new. China has a long history of aiding the developing world 
and Africa. 
 
3.3. Chinese aid is not new 
China is hardly a “new” or “emerging” donor. During the Ming dynasty China supplied a 
medieval form of foreign aid to its allies to maintain regional stability through the tributary 
system (Markovtis, Strange and Tingley 2019, 595), and they have assisted other countries for 
decades since the Peoples Republic was proclaimed and formally established in 1949. At the 
offset this started as an ideologically motivated form of foreign aid to spark revolution in the 
recipient countries and promote international communism. But this gradually changed into the 
pragmatic aid program known today.  
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3.3.1. Ideologically driven foreign aid 
The assistance China provided used to be based on ideological kinship but is today balanced 
on pragmatism. But China does have a history of applying developmental finance to buy 
political influence and expand its sphere of influence. During the Cold War, the Chinese were 
very generous in aid disbursements. The Chinese offered grants and interest rate-free loans 
(DiLorenzo and Cheng 2019, 125; Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010, 863). Chinese foreign 
aid to Africa was characteristically “prestige aid” projects (Morgenthau 1962, 303). Large-
scale construction projects like football stadiums, foreign ministry buildings, and railroads 
served as spectacular displays of symbolic diplomacy. A famous example from the 1970s is 
the building and loan-finance of the TARZA railroad, which connected to the then capital of 
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia (Alden 2005, 150; Morgan and Zheng 
2019, 1291). Some empirical evidence suggests that the bonds formed between China and 
African countries during the Mao era still affects the aid allocation pattern today. Morgan found 
that Chinese foreign aid was also allocated to African countries with longer traditions of 
cooperation with China, and flows would be biased toward these countries, particularly in the 
sectors education, health, transport, water irrigation, and agriculture (Morgan 2018, 230). Since 
the Peoples Republics inception in 1949, developmental aid was one of Chinas primary foreign 
policy instruments in its relation to developing countries. But the allocation was biased in favor 
of like-minded socialist friendly regimes (Kragelund 2008, 571; Strange 2019, 265).  
 
3.3.2. Paradigm shift 
China tended to allocate less aid to countries aligned with the United States, but this changed, 
after 1971 when they were fully incorporated into the international community. With the Sino-
Soviet split in the 1960s, US détente policies, and Chinas welcoming into the UN, ideologically 
driven selectivity for aid was increasingly considered obsolete by the Politburo. The pool of 
potential African recipients became larger (Morgan 2018, 222). But overall, the generosity of 
the Chinese aid levels in the form of grants and favorable loans was not hugely affected, 
because they competed with the Soviet Union for favorability in developing countries 
(Kragelund 2008, 571). In the 1980s, there was a paradigm shift that can partly be explained 
by the improving relations with the United States and the Soviet Union resulting in de-
escalation of proxy support. Chinese development assistance also gradually seized as it became 
apparent that the cost-benefit ratio was neither fiscally responsible nor sustainable. Thus came 
a paradigm shift in Chinese development assistance. Instead of supporting socialist regimes, 
the primary intent was to stimulate Chinese economic interests. In 1980 the Central Committee 
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of the Communist Party (CCP) central committee decreed that foreign aid would be selectively 
targeted to recipients based on the benefit it would give China (Morgan and Zheng 2019, 1291; 
Strange 2019, 267).  
 
3.3.3. The end of the Cold War and go global policy  
The good relations China had built with African countries during the Cold War and proved to 
be useful in the 1990s in the wake of the Tiananmen square massacre. China became isolated 
from the international community and condemned by the West but found maintained support 
among several African countries (Kragelund 2008, 572; Strange 2019, 268). Several African 
leaders refrained from condemning the Chinese government during the Tiananmen square 
uprisings and supported China amidst Western condemnation. China also received support 
from African nations in the effort to marginalize Taiwanese entry into the international 
community, and this has been an important factor for Chinese aid polices in the region (Taylor 
2006, 939). China has gained support in several developing countries for its ‘One China 
policy’, an effort to exclude Taiwan from full access in the international community by 
providing generously development assistance and fostering good relationships with African 
countries (Broich 2017, 183). Support has also manifested itself into fruition for China in the 
UN. African countries have supported blocking UN resolutions in condemning Chinese human 
rights abuses, which for instances helped China fend off critics when they amassed 
international support for Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 summer Olympics (Alden 2005, 153). 
 
The larger shift was during the 1990s when China initiated its ‘go out policy’. Chinese firms 
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) entered African markets. It would be a joint and massive 
effort of strengthening the Chinese economy. During the 1990s grant like concessional projects 
decreased and commercial projects increased. It was during this period that the Chinese 
combined traditional aid strategies with investments and sectoral market-based financing 
(Morgan and Zheng 2019, 1292). At the dawn of the millennium, this ‘go out policy’ 
encouraged Chinese companies and enterprises to invest in foreign countries, provide technical 
assistance, enter into partnerships with companies and governments abroad and partake in aid 
projects that could help strengthening their competitive ability (Bader 2015b, 142; Brand, 
McEwen-Fial and Muno 2015, 16). 1994 was the year the Export Import Bank of China (China 
Eximbank) and China Developmental Bank (CBD) were established. Both are run by Chinas 
Ministry of Finance and among their responsibilities are providing concessional loans and 
commercial investments (Morgan and Zheng 2019, 1292). This package approach to aid and 
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economic cooperation as part of the ‘go out policy’ have been researched. Biggeri and 
Sanfilippo found that it was a complex interaction between FDI, foreign aid, and trade that 
were the main drivers for Chinese foreign policy activities in Africa. But they also found 
country characteristics like natural resource abundance as highly stimulating factors for 
attracting Chinese bilateral cooperation (Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009, 46). The importance of 
natural resources cannot be understated, and it can be explained by the Chinese economies 
demand for petroleum fuels. China is in an energy transition period. The need to ensure energy 
security is not covered by the oil within China own borders. Oil imports is therefore sought in 
other countries (Broich 2017, 183). Access to natural resources is important to maintain 
sustainable growth for China because it allows them to compensate for domestic resource 
shortages (DiLorenzo and Cheng 2019, 129-130). A strong economy is among the Chinese 
leadership top priorities to keep the peace internally and suppress dissenters, and energy 
security is an important factor in order to attain that stability. To sustain the massive economic 
growth the Chinese economy has displayed over the last decades, petroleum and mineral 
resources have been deemed important for China to sustain this progress (Cheung et al. 2012, 
217; Bader and Daxecker 2015, 777). 
 
3.3.4. Chinese aid today 
Chinese aid today is typically flexible and effectively implemented, which is a large part of the 
appeal of Chinese financial assistance for countries that desperately need it (Yushi et al. 2020, 
4). Chinese aid consists of grants and interest rate-free loans and more concessional loans, 
market loans, export credits, state sponsored investments, or package proposals which bundle 
together all of them. The involved actors is often either the EximBank, CBD, or various 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (Kragelund 2008, 573; Morgan and Zheng 2019, 1295). 
Providing the recipients available loans with low interest rate is a central difference from DAC 
aid, which is often more grant based. DAC Loans are also usually customized to prevent too 
heavy debt burdens (Kragelund 2008, 577). The package approach to foreign aid has often been 
called “the Angola model”. In these bundles of foreign direct investment (FDI), trade bargains, 
and low-interest rate loans, and construction of big and ambitious infrastructure projects, 
Chinese SOEs are the main implementers and Chinese labor is used. Therefore, the economic 
stimulus from these projects kicks back to the Chinese economy rather than to economy the 
recipient country (Bader and Daxecker 2015, 778; Bader 2015b, 142; Martuscelli 2020, 287). 
The infrastructure projects are often financed in that Chinese government collateralizes access 
to oil in return for the credit (Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010, 874). After signing of a 
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bilateral agreement, a sort of infrastructure-for-resources swap ensue, where the China 
EximBank provides loans and while the recipient government has security in its sales from 
primary commodities like oil. Concessional loans can have a repayment period to as much as 
15 years which usually starts as soon as a project is in the beginning phase of being 
implemented, and often takes the form of export credits tied to rights of procurement of 
reproduces. But the Chinese government selects the implementing firms, which are usually 
Chinese. ‘The Angola model’ has only been implemented in Angola, Ghana, DR Congo, 
Nigeria, and Sudan (Kitano and Harada 2016, 1051; Martuscelli 2020, 294; Tan-Mullins, 
Mohan and Power 2010, 868). While the representativeness of this practice is uncertain, it 
implies a Chinese interest in oil in Africa. And for critics it is anecdotal evidence of Chinese 
self-interest guiding their foreign aid policy.  
 
State and commercial interests in China have long considered Africa a region of vital interest 
because of the continent’s vast natural resource endowments. While the interest in Africa used 
to be ideological in an effort to spread communism as a Cold War strategy, since the 1990s it 
has been commercial and what traditionally would be aid in the self-interest category. This 
means that the allocation basis has more emphasis on establishing links where natural resources 
are present and stimulant markets exist. (Taylor 2006, 944). China also imposes no 
conditionalities on governance or democracy and promote a practice of non-interference. The 
only clear Chinese conditionality is acceptance of the One China principle, requiring countries 
to not to recognize Taiwan as independent from mainland China (McCormick 2008, 82). As 
mentioned, Western donors have put an emphasis on good governance and democracy, while 
they have criticized the Chinese for ignoring such determinants as eligibility. They further 
accuse China of favoring countries with natural resources, especially petroleum endowments. 
The alleged ‘aid for oil strategy’ involves financial assistance being used to fund construction 
and infrastructure projects. In exchange China gets easier access to oil rents, while such deals 
also letting them circumvent the market price for crude oil (Zafar 2007, 120). 
 
FIGURE 1 shows the evolution of amounts from all commitments of Chinese aid to Africa 
between 2000 to 2014 based on data from Dreher et al. (2017). This data will be discussed 
further in the data and empirical sections. As can be clearly seen in Figure 1, Chinese aid 
increases steadily from the early 2000s around the time Chinas ‘Go out’ policy was officially 
launched. Interestingly, the aid level drops dramatically in 2008, the year of the global financial 






4. Chinese foreign aid – The problematic characteristics  
 
4.1. Positive aspects 
Before starting with the troubling characteristics and potential implications of Chinese foreign 
aid to Africa, it is worth to take note that it is not uniformly accepted that their activity is a bad 
thing. There are nuances to Chinese developmental policies. More positive interpretations 
assume that foreign aid from emerging donors will be better targeted to further development 
because many of these donors were recently recipients of foreign aid themselves. From 
experience, they should understand which sectors to prioritize when allocating developmental 
assistance. The recipient countries will, by this logic, be more trusting of donors that have 
shared their development experience (Dreher et al. 2011, 1951). This is also seen as a 
counterpoint to the traditional OECD-led aid regime. As discussed, the conditionalities 
particularly related to good governance imposed on developing countries has been perceived 
to be discriminatory and condescending. With the growing frustration of these rigid 
requirements, aid from alternative donors became increasingly attractive. Chinese aid without 
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tied conditionalities has therefore been viewed as a more flexible alternative requiring less 
institutional costs for the recipient governments (Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand 2010, 4). 
 
Chinese aid is also efficient and quickly implemented which is highly appealing compared to 
the DAC system which is increasingly viewed as too bureaucratic and slow in implementation. 
African leaders have indicated that the ability to alleviate poverty and promote development is 
hampered. When bureaucratic red tape prevents effective solutions to urgent problems (Li 
2017, 207). No conditionalities means less rigidity and bureaucracy in loan repayment 
procedures and more efficient implementation of projects. This is therefore an important reason 
explaining why African countries can be attracted to bilateral agreements with China 
(Martuscelli 2020, 294). The Sierra Leone ambassador to China is often quoted in this regard, 
saying, “The Chinese just come and do it. They don’t hold meetings about environmental 
impact assessments, human rights, bad governance and good governance. I’m not saying it’s 
right, just that Chinese investments is succeeding because they don’t set high benchmarks” 
(Taylor 2006, 946). Positively viewed then, the Chinese provide foreign aid in a way that 
enables African governments to build their institutions through infrastructure and markets, not 
through rigid rules of institutional benchmarks that have to be reached pre-commitment (Yushi 
et al. 2020, 5). Chinas defenders reject the notion that the emerging donor is sabotaging the 
effort to improve governance and democracy, but rather that they expose the aspirations of 
DACs conditionalities as unrealistic and the incentives for development unhelpful. Called a “a 
silent revolution”, it has now come to be accepted that the emerging donor countries are in the 
global aid game to stay. They have gradually been gaining legitimacy at a time as the DAC 
regime is losing its monopoly on foreign aid (Gulrajani and Swiss 2019, 363; Woods 2008, 
1221). 
 
It might also be facile to assume counterproductive outcomes from Chinese influence. If one 
takes the perspective of modernization theory, then improvement of infrastructure, education, 
and health promises development no matter who provides it. A more vibrant market economy 
might ready a society for democratization in the long term. Improvement of infrastructure could 
improve human rights because there is a known link between increased state capacity and 
improvement of human rights (Bader 2015b, 4; Bader and Daxecker 2015, 777). Infrastructure 
can also have a positive effect on trade and the growth of the local economy. It increases 
mobility and reduces costs of transporting goods (Martuscelli 2020, 293). Some estimates have 
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found that Chinese aid and investments account for up to 20 % of reconstruction of the African 
infrastructure sector between 2008 and 2011. 
The donor country China is not completely absent from contributing to the social sectors either. 
In their 2014 white paper, the Chinese government claims to prioritize education, building 
schools, and providing scholarships and ramped up free medical care for local populations in 
various countries (Brautigam 2011, 762; Morgan and Zheng 2019, 1293; White Paper 2014). 
And while China has focused a lot on infrastructure, the OECD for the past 30 years focused 
more on capacity building and social sectors (Martuscelli 2020, 294; Morgan and Zheng 2019, 
1296). Even if Chinese development assistance is an instrument to access natural resources in 
a developing country, which has been the charge in Angola, the net effect could be positive as 
investments in roads, bridges, railways, power grids and hydropower is useful to reduce 
poverty and promote development (Bader and Daxecker 2015, 778). 
 
4.2. Problematic characteristics  
But why should Chinese foreign aid allocation be so detrimental compared to development 
assistance from the DAC countries? While Western donors have put emphasis on 
conditionalities for aid, the Chinese government have been criticized for ignoring such 
conditions. The conventional recipient merit perspective posits that DAC donor countries will 
allocate aid to reward developing countries that governs well institutionally, economically, and 
democratically, based on the assumptions that aid is more effective in such environments 
(Dreher and Fuchs 2015, 994). But as have now been discussed in some detail, China is often 
assumed to be allocating aid based on recipient self-interest.  
 
4.2.1. Main characteristics of Chinese foreign aid 
There are generally two characteristics scholars emphasize stand out with the Chinese foreign 
aid program. First, China adheres to a principle of non-interference in the recipient countries 
internal affairs. Second, the bilateral agreements are based on mutual benefit, which means that 
developmental projects also must be beneficial for the Chinese economy. (Kragelund 2008, 
571).  
 
The first characteristic, non-interference, is elaborated in the Chinese governments 2014 white 
paper. China explicitly stipulates that no political conditionalities are required in exchange for 
providing foreign assistance (White Paper 2014). The principle of noninterference has been the 
guiding principle of Chinese aid, thus a pronounced and official position of not interfering in 
 24 
the internal affairs of other countries. McCormick pointed out that the hypothetical negative 
effects of Chinese aid with regard to governance is largely based on the assumption that having 
a partnership with the Chinese might encourage other types of institutional norms and will 
supersede the Western pressure for good governance (McCormick 2008, 87). Some African 
leaders might prefer Chinese cooperation exactly because of the lack of conditionalities (Tan-
Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010, 875). 
The noninterference policy has put China in closer cooperation with repressive and 
neopatrimonial regimes like the governments of Angola, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, and Sudan. 
Chinese steadfast assistance to these countries has by some scholars been mentioned as an 
explanation for these countries’ refusal to reform (Martuscelli 2020, 288). But as mentioned, 
there is a condition China has been known to expect potential recipient’s honor: the acceptance 
of the One China policy and requirement of no formal diplomatic connections to Taiwan (Bader 
2015a, 25). 
China has justified the non-interference policy as mutual respect based on “South-South 
cooperation”. The touchstone of South-South cooperation has rather been horizontal 
cooperation among equals where mutual advantage and non-interference are the principal 
norms (Gulrajani and Swiss 2019, 353; de Renzio and Seifert 2014, 1861). It is framed as the 
antithesis to perceived paternalistic Western aid regime. The Chinese government explicitly 
states that their foreign aid program “adhere to the principles of (…) fully respecting their right 
to independently choosing their own paths and models of development” (White Paper 2014). 
It therefore does not matter whether if the recipient government is repressive or attained power 
through a coup. The non-interference doctrine is useful in this way, because the Chinese will 
always do official dealings with the winning coalitions in a state, regardless of whether they 
attained power through undemocratic methods (Bader 2015c, 14). The Chinese also often 
underscore a shared history with Africa, through historical Sino-African relations dating back 
centuries, as well as a shared history of Western mistreatment. Cooperation with Africa then, 
is what former Premier Zhou Enlai called ‘the poor helping the poor’ (Tan-Mullins, Mohan 
and Power 2010, 865-866). 
 
The second major characteristic of Chinese foreign aid that has been deemed exploitative is the 
economic cooperation agreements with win-win implications. Foreign aid must favor China as 
much as (if not more than) the partnering recipient countries. China’s strategy is reminiscent 
of how the Japanese used to apply its foreign with China as recipient. The Japanese aid practice 
was a ‘quid pro quo approach’ where large credits in Chinese goods and services generously 
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were offered, with the possibility of repayment through oil and natural resources (Bräutigam 
2009, 307). Central to this are these so-called infrastructure-for-resources swap agreements 
mentioned earlier, exemplified by the Chinese assistance to Angola in the early 2000s. Part of 
such agreements was that Chinese SOEs would be awarded the lion share of construction and 
engineering contracts. In some cases, as much as 50% of procurement materials had to originate 
from China. Credit granted or loaned would kick back to the Chinese economy while very little 
spilled over to the recipient’s domestic economy (Martuscelli 2020, 297; Tan-Mullins, Mohan 
and Power 2010, 869; Yushi et al. 2020, 7). 
 
The often-cited horror case of these two characteristics is Angola. When the Angolan civil war 
ended in 2002, Western donors imposed conditionalities on the Angolan government, urging it 
to adopt an IMF staff-monitored programme (SMP) in order to demonstrate that the country 
implemented reforms and was becoming a safe environment for investment and trade. But the 
Chinese offered an alternative source of revenue for the Angolan government in the form of 
oil-backed credit lines with no such political strings attached. The dos Santos regime turned to 
the Chinese EximBank, which offered greater loans than the IMF with more generous 
repayment plans. But the agreement tied in commitments to the oil supply and future contracts. 
As a result, China received 10,000 barrels per day, and the Angolans received huge loans with 
over a decade to pay back with generous interest rates. In implementing and constructing huge 
and ambitious infrastructure projects, only 30% of contracts went to domestic firms while the 
rest was taken by Chinese contractors, thus Angolans benefited less from these Chinese funded 
projects (Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010, 868; Taylor 2006, 947). 
 
Broadly speaking, it is mainly derived from these donor characteristics that form the Western 
assumptions that Chinese foreign aid being self-interest based that this thesis is going to 
scrutinize. China pays no heed to democracy or good governance. They consider aid as more 
economic cooperation intended to kick back to the Chinese economy rather than development 
assistance helping recipient countries become sustainable. Critics of the Chinese aid program 
therefore assume self-interest to guide the donors’ intentions. Furthermore, there are several 
traits with African countries that makes financial assistance not taking account of institutional 
vulnerability, horizontal accountability, and rent seeking, potentially detrimental to long-term 
development. Institutional quality is particularly important if the recipient countries of interest 
are abundant with natural resources. And as have widely recognized among scholars, potential 
oil import is the most important energy source for China (Lee 2019, 577). 
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4.2.2. Chinese aid and the resource curse  
There is an established link between management of natural resources, poor governance and 
corruption. These developmental quandaries have plagued several African countries for 
decades. The link between resource abundance and poor growth and governance, particularly 
in sub–Saharan Africa, is a fundamental issue in the resource curse literature. And it is 
important for the purposes of research because poor institutional functioning is prevalent across 
Africa (Martuscelli 2020, 291; Ross 2015, 250). The concern is that increased Chinese 
influence under the guise of non-interference will make some oil abundant countries vulnerable 
to rentierism and increased corruption. This would consequently undermine the Western 
strategy of improving conditions inhibiting development and self-sustaining growth (Zafar 
2007, 106). There is of course an obvious hypocritical aspect of the most hardline Western 
rhetoric berating Chinese policies as “exploitative”,  
 
Corruption has widely been referred to as the exercise of public power for private gain. This 
definition is often reserved to cover corruption conducted by public officials, or people in 
government that abuse their positions for private gain (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006, 808). Countries 
dependent on resource extraction have often resulted in poor governance and authoritarian rule. 
In Sudan for instance, where Chinese firms have been quite involved, some analysts believe 
governance became worse because large-scale Chinese involvement incentivized the 
government only to enhance capacity in the natural resource extraction sectors, while 
neglecting to improve institutional quality or democratic principles (Kaplinsky et al. 2007, 41). 
An inherent fear of several OECD donor countries is that the absence of reform and improved 
polices with regard to governance and accountability institutions will incentivize the recipient 
countries to postpone needed reforms in these sectors. A patron state only interested in the 
resource extraction sectors risk leading to deteriorating institutions and is in the long term a 
setback for economic development. There is an inherent dependency and asymmetry in this 
situation. The dependency is unreciprocated in that the donor country can terminate the flows 
without direct costs, while termination might have large negative consequences for the 
recipient country. It also implies that the donor country has a degree of control over the 
recipient country (McKinlay and Little 1977, 63). 
 
Pessimistically viewed, the nonrestrictive conditions of Chinese developmental assistance 
could be normalized. The incentive to improve functions like the state’s infrastructural power, 
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ability to collect taxes, and control over corruption, will be weakened because natural resources 
might be a available and reliable source of revenue. Ruling elites have no reasons to improve 
these sectors, and patron states might indulge them further (Manning 2006, 381). The state is 
not funded by taxation made possible through institutions, but through oil rents. Government 
responsiveness to its citizens is poor because the state is not dependent on them as taxpayers 
(Bader and Daxecker 2015, 776). Only extractive institutions are developed. They risk being 
the only sectors susceptible to institutional learning and productivity. The incentives to 
diversify the economy are also weakened. This is an unfortunate ramification because growth 
in extractive sectors often does not link with growth in the local economy, only within the oil 
sectors (Kolstad, Wiig and Williams 2008, 20; Martuscelli 2020, 298). When the Chinese 
allocate foreign aid to such countries with without any conditions for improving governance 
and the functioning of institutions, it risks exacerbating trends associated with the resource 
curse thesis (Taylor 2006, 956). Even though the concept of the resource curse is contested, the 
existence of it seems only valid when natural resource abundance appears simultaneously with 
a country having low quality institutions. Social scientists in general share a consensus that 
natural resource abundance leads to more corruption and rent seeking (Brunnschweiler 2008, 
404). If the institutions in a resource abundant country are deficient and weak, the discretion 
actors have over petroleum and mineral endowments is not confronted by fundamental checks 
and balances. Constraints designed to remove the incentives for patronage and rent-seeking are 
not present (Kolstad, Wiig and Williams 2008, 22). 
 
Proponents of OECD-DAC and western aid policies would say conditionalities and 
requirements for institutional reform, control of corruption, and democratization is the antidote 
against such ramifications and that Chinas non- interference doctrine is negative in indulging 
it. In Baders (2015a) view, a principle of non-interference only holds while the political actors 
in the recipient country have equal access to political power. Non-interference policy in 
practice only favors actors that mange to monopolize power by repressive and authoritarian 
means (Bader 2015a, 25). Collier accused China of making African prospects for development 
worse with their blatant disregard for good governance and democracy, because the high prices 
for natural resource exports will result in the resource curse unless institutions are robust and 
constraining (Collier 2007, 86). But in the case for the poorest countries with petroleum 




5. Theoretical expectations from a donor self-interest perspective  
So far perspectives and concerns from scholars, pundits, and government spokespeople have 
been discussed. They underscore an inherent suspicion of Chinese intentions in Africa. Aptly 
put to its extreme; they are afraid that the Chinese seek to exploit resource rich countries in 
Africa. The assumption is that China is attempting gain a competitive advantage in order to 
attain this by also cultivating poorly governed regimes which possess oil. Based on what have 
been discussed on the characteristics of Chinese foreign aid, their justifications for non-
interference, and the institutional vulnerability of developing countries possessing vast natural 
resource reserves, this section theoretically argues for which determinants with African 
recipients might attract a donor with opportunistic intentions.  
 
The question of donor intent and motives from a self-interest perspective typically postulate 
that the presence of natural resources in a recipient country will draw an opportunistic donor 
country to allocate more there. As mentioned, China is in a phase of energy transition and need 
for foreign oil imports. Today, China along with the United States are the largest net importer 
of foreign oil in the world. Most of it comes from the Middle East or Africa (Lee 2019, 571). 
This is in line with the expectation several academics have raised when researching emerging 
donors. China’s energy consumption has its origin mostly from foreign suppliers, which means 
China have to cultivate and maintain good bilateral relationships with countries rich on natural 
resources in order to sustain a healthy economy and ultimately political order (Lee 2019, 570). 
Some empirical evidence supports this. While researching outward foreign investments, 
Cheung et al. (2012) found that Chinese investors had a preference for targeting African 
countries with an abundance of oil and mineral resources. But this effect dwindled when 
traditional FDI determinants were introduced (2012, 217). Lee found that countries’ oil 
production is positively associated with receiving Chinese bilateral partnerships and state visits 
(Lee 2019, 584). In this sense, energy security seems to influence Chinese official state visits. 
For the Chinese, these are strategic measures to protect their energy supply from market 
volatility and foreign rivals in African countries. Taking these facts into consideration, the 
expectation should be that China will allocate more towards countries with abundance of oil 
endowments. Even though aid is not directly tied to energy sectors, it will still foster a bilateral 
cooperation and good relationship between China and the oil producing country (Lee 2019, 
573). Hence, attain Chinese self-interests.  
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5.1. DAC circumvention  
As have been mentioned, China famously adheres to a policy of non-interference, rejecting 
“Western lectures about governance and human rights”. (Dreher et al. 2011, 1951). No strings 
attached assistance from China can enable developing country governments to turn down 
Western aid with tied demands. It removes incentives to improve fiscal policy, governance, 
human rights, environmental protection, and democracy. With alternative assistance, the fear 
is that developing countries will neglect working towards improving their institutions like the 
World Bank and OECD have incentivized. Western donors perceive this supply of new 
emerging donor aid as circumvention of their developmental policies (Woods 2008, 1210-
1211). China is accused of furthering its own economic self-interest and short-term profit at 
the cost of institutional development and sustainability. This is considered as undermining of 
imposing much needed reforms on illiberal and poorly governed regimes (Barma and Ratner 
2006; Pehnelt 2007, 11). While the DAC conditionality regime dictating governance in 
developing countries has lost some credibility, the Chinese government claim they respect 
recipient’s countries national sovereignty. But they are accused of causing detrimental effects 
on development by rejecting incentives with demands for institutional reform. Recipient 
governments that seek to maintain status quo will undoubtably find the alternative of no-
strings-attached Chinese aid far more appealing than rigid conditional western aid (Li 2017, 
206). The cynical view posits increased Chinese foreign aid allocation where democracy, 
governance and human rights are poor and that Chinese activity in these countries will lead to 
further deterioration (Dreher and Fuchs 2015, 995). But from the recipients’ point of view, 
China will not meddle in their systems. Bilateral cooperation with the Chinese serves as an 
opportunity for increased trade and investment. And from China’s point of view this can be a 
strategic way to gain international support from African countries in competition with western 
powers and they have easier access to the oil markets. As mentioned, justified as South-South 
cooperation, both parties are viewed as benefactors of this win-win foreign aid policy. Win-
win approaches free from conditionalities is exemplified by Chinas alleged “aid for oil” 
strategies already mentioned, where foreign aid contributes in constructing large infrastructure 
projects in exchange for access to oil outputs (Alden 2005, 153; Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand 
2010, 7; McCormick 2008, 85). 
 
But the fact that the Chinese are open to assist even in countries the West deem ineligible is a 
statement. Assuming the availability of alternative sources of foreign aid makes African 
countries refuse to comply with Western conditionalities and DAC aid consequently dissipate, 
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a reduction of DAC aid should mean an increase in Chinese aid. Competition between donors 
is not a new hypothesized argument. There have been instances in the past where China has 
been the favored partner over Western institutions like the World Bank. For instance, the 
Nigerian government preferred in 2006 cooperation with the Chinese government and Chinese 
engineering SOEs in rebuilding of their railway system (Chen 2018, 2; Li 2017, 207; Naím 
2007, 96). Some analysts have therefore hypothesized that China will allocate to countries 
where DAC have withdrawn its activity. This could potentially be countries refusing to comply 
with conditionalities (Morgan 2018, 220). That is, when a regime is isolated from the DAC and 
they withdraw their assistance, one might expect the Chinese to allocate more to this country 
the following year to fill the vacuum and exploiting a window of opportunity when Western 
presence is weakened. 
 
There is debate among scholars to what extent aid from one donor can affect allocation from 
another donor to the same recipient. Situations where donor countries are in competition with 
one another for influence can occur. An increase by one donor might make the competitor 
follows suit, or a decrease could signal a power vacuum ready to be filled (Davies and Klasen 
2019, 252). This is reminiscent the so-called Bandwagon effect, in which any given donors aid 
allocation to a recipient country was thought to increase in function as response to other donors 
increasing aid to the same country. Such response aid is regarded as a self-interest factor 
(McGillivray and White 1993, 24). It is based on information learning among donors. Just the 
signal of more allocation to one particular recipient by certain donor countries might signal to 
other competing donor countries that allocating to this recipient could have profitable 
implications. Bandwagon effects where donors allocate more to other donors’ “darlings” or 
“orphans”, either based on good experience or the assumption of privately kept information 
that this recipient is a rational selection (Davies and Klasen 2019, 251). Assuming the Chinese 
foreign ministry seek to fill vacuums left by decreasing Western support in African countries, 
one could expect this to influence Chinese aid allocation. Davies and Klasen found that a 
country will increase its concessional aid by almost 0.46% if all other countries increase theirs 
by one percent a given year, particularly to so-called favored “recipient darlings”. However, 
this effect was also bigger for the largest donor countries, suggesting that the more resourceful 
donors also possess the best information and does make such calculations to a larger extent 
(Davies and Klasen 2019, 271-272). If the assumption is that China seeks to fill vacuums left 
by DAC retreating its activity, whether because of not acting in line with conditionalities or 
need being perceived as reduced, a decrease in DAC aid should be responded by an increase in 
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Chinese aid. To answer whether China circumvent DAC strategy by allocating to countries the 
western countries have decreased its funding, the first hypothesis is: 
 
H1 – Chinese aid increase after DAC assistance have decreased  
 
Put another way, the hypothesis to be tested is therefore whether China allocate more where 
DAC have withdrawn and allocate less towards. If it does not affect foreign aid, this would it 
suggest that the Chinese view the OECDs efforts in Africa with indifference. If China allocates 
more, it might be an indication of the China aim to fill the power vacuum. 
 
5.2. Rogue aid, governance, and special preferences for cooperation 
As have been discussed in detail by now, the problem with Chinese aid to developing countries 
is widely considered to be that the lack of conditionalities disincentivize recipient governments 
improvement of institutions and democracy. Their aid program supposedly does not aim to 
boost economic development in the recipient country, but rather stimulate the Chinese 
economy. But while this is viewed as undermining of the OECD strategy of development 
assistance, the more severe accusation is that China actually prefers poor governance and 
democracy in the recipient countries.  
 
This is connected to the so called ‘rogue aid’ perspective. The suspicion is that China applies 
foreign aid as an instrument to strengthen autocracies and sabotage Western efforts of 
institution building and democratization in developing countries (Dreher et al. 2018, 185). 
China is also accused of targeting its foreign aid to resource cursed autocracies as means for 
easier access to natural resource exports. Foreign aid is posited to gain the allegiance of the 
recipient countries, and the fewer institutional checks in place the better. The Chinese 
supposedly then, prefer authoritarianism and actively counteract spreading of Western 
institutionalism and counteract democracy promotion (Naím 2007, 95). 
The more conventional and nuanced views condemning Chinese activity in Africa, as discussed 
earlier, are more concerned with the way China disincentivizes African recipients to 
democratize and implement developmental policies. But the rogue aid perspective goes even 
further and accuses China of targeting and exploiting of authoritarian and corrupt states and 
actively disrupting the OECD-DAC agenda (Furuoka 2017, 378). Pehnelt concludes that China 
has gained access to markets and natural resource endowments in African countries partly by 
this deliberate strategy, fragile pariah states like Sudan and Angola (Pehnelt 2007, 10). If 
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countries find themselves isolated from the international community, as has occasionally been 
the case for recipients like Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Angola, their reliance on alternative donors 
might be substantial and the permissiveness in accommodating them lenient.  
 
Critical views widely fearing Chinese intentions of promoting authoritarianism are only 
exacerbated by the fact that China is an autocracy and has both domestically and internationally 
counteracted democratic movements and institutions. Democracy is a rivaling axiom of 
governance. Some experts fear it could be rational for China to disrupt and sabotage the spread 
of liberal and democratic practices as democratization is viewed as an external threat to the 
Chinese order (Broich 2017, 182). Authoritarian regimes like China, by this understanding, 
have an incentive to support similarly governed states and prevent them from “falling into the 
democracy camp” (Brand, McEwen-Fial and Muno 2015, 8). There are also instances of China 
struggling to maintain control in African countries possessing democratic institutions, like 
stronger press freedom and vibrant civil society organizations like workers’ rights unions 
(Michel 2008, 45). There have for example been instances of popular inputs toward 
governments in Zambia and Senegal in the form of protests and grass roots movements 
demanding regulation and oversight of Chinese projects. And closer to mainland China, Bader 
found that they were more successful influencing autocracies with a small ruling elite like 
Burma and Cambodia (Bader 2015b, 7). Some scholars further argue that geopolitical patrons 
will have an easier time bribing loyalty of autocratic regimes because the elites in these 
countries face less accountability and fewer checks and balances on their power than in 
democratic regimes. Powerful geopolitical patron states, like China and the United States, 
might have an incentive to support autocracies if a democratic transition could jeopardize an 
existing agreement between the respective countries. In that case, the durability of 
authoritarianism with few veto players and a limited decision echelon is desired for a 
continuation (Bader 2015a, 24). Democratization scholars call this external influence “black-
knight support”, where powerful counter-hegemonic actors, like Russia, China and Iran, use 
their substantial political, military, and economic leverage to take advantage of weaker states 
with aid dependent economies (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41). The external influence models, 
when applied to autocracies, suggest that autocrats use external linkages and rents to exert 
influence in other countries in order to strengthen their own position and regimes durability 
(Bader 2015a, 24). 
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Notwithstanding, Vanderhill, questions these assumptions because there is no evidence of the 
Chinese government actively supporting any coalition of autocrats seeking to seize power as 
part of their foreign policy strategy. The Chinese disregard for democracy and governance 
might consolidate authoritarian regimes, but their goal is access to energy resources like 
petroleum and minerals, not autocratization. The Chinese governments means might spread 
authoritarianism, but the ends are strictly economic. China is therefore not like Russia, Iran, 
and Venezuela, all of which do have policy of supporting authoritarianism as an effort to 
prevent the spread of democracy and US friendly regimes (Vanderhill 2013, 6). The active 
preference for autocracy seems only to be valid to China in regard to their neighboring 
countries. The most verbose contemporary actor in destabilizing aid is widely accepted to be 
Russia. Under Vladimir Putin, the Russians have particularly in eastern Europe provided 
technical assistance, monetary and material funding to insurgents, and support for opposition 
parties and pro-Russian groups (Markovtis, Strange and Tingley 2019, 609). 
And even though there are examples of China promoting authoritarianism and actively 
counteract democracy in regimes of interest, this has mainly been the case with regard to Chinas 
neighboring countries. Closer to home, the Chinese government is more concerned with 
bordering countries democratic movements and spillover effects. That is particularly 
concerning to the autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, which are more threatening 
because of their substantial ethnic and religious minorities still opposed to the communist party 
(Kaestner 2010, 2). Today, the most infamous example of Chinese black knight support 
through foreign aid is the provision of substantial humanitarian assistance to North Korea. 
However, this maintenance of the status quo of this totalitarian regime is a measure to prevent 
mass starvation, state collapse and a mass exodus of refugees journeying to the border and 
entering Chinas north-east provinces Liaoning and Jilin (Markovtis, Strange and Tingley 2019, 
605). This is a notable distinction from foreign aid provided to countries on the African 
continent, thousands of miles away. It is therefore unlikely that China will have a fierce 
preference of non-democracies over democracies in Africa. 
 
There are however theoretical and empirical indications that certain determinants with non-
democratic regimes could influence the aid allocation behavior, such as corruption. The 
widespread corruption in Africa has not discouraged Chinese investors from engaging in 
economic partnerships in several African countries while their western counterparts have been 
cautious in such unpredictable environments. This is according to surveys of Chinese 
commercial actors (Gu 2009, 578). Some researchers explain this with the smaller institutional 
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gap between African countries and China. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are 
the main implementers of foreign aid projects, have an easier time steering in such 
environments compared to Western actors (Ado and Su 2016, 49). Some schools of thought 
actually posit corruption as a positive mechanism in order to put “grease in the wheel of 
commerce”. By this understanding, corruption facilitate transactions and businesses. It speeds 
up the processes by circumventing rigid bureaucratic checks and misguided regulation 
(Cuervo-Cazurra 2006, 808; Cremer 2008, 18). 
 
Theories that postulate that corruption and bribery can speed up otherwise slow and inefficient 
bureaucratic processes are not new. Corruption, according to these theories speed up the 
decision processes reducing the costs of waiting periods and implementation of projects. 
Supposedly then, Chinese SOEs, directed by the Chinese government, face less difficulties in 
environments typically associated with poor institutions and patronage networks based on 
personal connections unconstrained by regulation is the norm. The Chinese should by this 
understanding have a preference for entering markets, investing and developing in less 
institutionally regulated regimes where trust is based on “who you know” rather than rational-
legal institutional norms (Child and Rodrigues 2005, 406). The similarity of institutional 
environment is how scholars describe this. It is based on the concept of “psychic distance” 
between recipient and donor countries, that is the distance regarding language, culture, 
education, business practices, industrial development, and regulations, all of which may enable 
or constrain the transfer of information. Actors who are used to bribery and rent seeking have 
experience with conducting business in corrupt environments. They are used to paying bribes 
in order to secure permits and win contracts (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006, 811). And in fact, 
conventionally risky determinants like a high degree of corruption and societies weakness with 
respect to law and order have actually been found to encourage increasing Chinese investment 
to Africa (Cheung et al. 2012, 217). Overly corrupt business environments are not a particular 
high cost for them. 
 
The rentier statehood of many African countries is familiar territory for Chinese SOEs and 
policymakers. Potential bilateral relationships can be mutually beneficial because the political 
culture is easily accommodated. In this sense, it’s easy to promote sovereignty for countries 
where sovereignty and capacity is lacking to begin with. Institutional environments as such are 
exploitable. And where corruption is rampant and horizontal accountability is lacking, natural 
resource access can never be safe from rent-seeking. Taylor observed that the oil rich states 
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China are dealing with are not well functioning institutionally. Even though they can promote 
sovereignty and non-interference of the recipients’ internal affairs, they can act relatively 
unimpeded in these countries (Taylor 2006, 955). Pehnelt therefore conclude that Chinas non-
interference approach to developmental aid in Africa has given them a “historical comparative 
advantage” with rogue and isolated states western donors are reluctant to aid (Pehnelt 2007, 8-
9). However, Dreher and Fuchs (2015), when investigating rogue aid, found that bilateral 
exports, Taiwan non-recognition and UN voting alignment were important factors for Chinese 
aid allocation between 1996 and 2006. What they did not find, was evidence that the Chinese 
were targeting autocracies or corrupt countries (Dreher and Fuchs 2015, 1019). 
 
The rogue aid perspective has by many critics, perhaps not surprisingly, been deemed 
reductionistic and facile. But despite its pro-western bias, it is emblematic of a perception of 
Chinese foreign policy as aggressive and threatening to liberal democracy in the post-cold war 
era. The rogue aid proponents have been criticized for ignoring that many developing countries 
welcome Chinese foreign aid as a flexible alternative to the DAC aid programs. And as have 
been discussed, there are reasons to posit that further financing of in infrastructure and 
stimulation of the local markets promote modernization in the developing countries (Yushi et 
al. 2020, 2). Moreover, China was never a member of DAC and are therefore not bound to 
conduct foreign aid allocation in accordance with the OECD rules (Chahoud 2007, 2; Sears 
2019, 137). Being a non-member, China is exempt from accede to the strict reporting system 
and standards DAC donors must satisfy. But non-members cannot be expected to conform to 
this regime. Emerging donors were never part of the process of establishing the existing 
development assistance system and were never included in the committee processes 
establishing it during its inception. The system is considered exclusive, and emerging donors 
have not been integrated and welcomed into it (Woods 2008, 1212).  
The concern over supposed Chinese ‘rogue aid’ is not a new one. Such charges are reminiscent 
of fret reports of Chinese communist influence in the third world during the cold war (Strange 
2019, 260). And oil dependent economies in the developing world supplying powerful donors 
is nothing new. It is a phenomenon that predates Chinas emergence as a major actor in Africa 
(Bader and Daxecker 2015, 774). Several Western countries (also meaning DAC members) 
have been accused of similar strategies. The United States has cultivated close relationships 
with several unsavory and repressive regimes in the Middle East to ensure its energy security 
(Lee 2019, 573). Pundits from the west should be aware of potential hypocrisy when 
condemning Chinese policies in the developing world. Donor countries like France and the 
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United States have supported with oil rich countries themselves, without taking democracy and 
human rights into account (Taylor 2006, 953). There are in fact few studies that have found a 
robust relationship between US developmental foreign policy and democracy promotion 
(Bader and Daxecker 2015, 779). Its support with arms and aid to Saudi Arabia is an infamous 
example. The hypocrisy of The United States and the European Union is certainly present, in 
that both these actors have provided aid to authoritarian regimes themselves (Bader 2015a, 23). 
France have provided massive foreign aid to several oil producing countries in Africa, 
particularly to its former colonies (Lee 2019, 574). French governments have in the past helped 
maintaining authoritarian regimes that support their geopolitical interest, like in Cameroon and 
Gabon during the 1990s and the 2000s by steadfast support for the ruling elites amid popular 
opposition protests (Levitsky and Way 2010, 258). There is therefore nothing spectacular in 
itself that China might apply its external assistance to oil rich countries or autocracies. Russia 
and Iran have strategically utilized such targeting, and the United States have favored autocratic 
powers they find geostrategically important for decades (Bader 2015b, 4). 
 
But while cynical perspectives on Chinese intentions are rightly contested, it warrants further 
empirical investigation. The rogue aid perspective is often laid on Chinas door, but as Woods 
point out, there are scarce evidence to the allegations. Some evidence could even suggest 
positive effects of Chinese foreign aid, with higher growth rates, better terms of trade, and 
increased export volumes (Woods 2008, 1208). Also, while there is a Chinese demand for 
foreign suppliers of oil imports, it was during the 1990s China became a major net importer of 
oil. Given the fact that China has entered the global oil market only relatively recently, this 
assumed systematic dependence on the Chinese might not have fully been embedded in the 
global oil market (Bader and Daxecker 2015, 777). But derived from these debates and the fact 
that there are obstinate claims both from Western pundits and Chinese officials, the second 
hypothesis to be tested is:  
 
H2 – Chinese aid allocation is increase toward countries with abundance of oil 
endowments 
 
Oil abundance is tested with four different measures. This will be elaborated on later when 
discussing the data. A third expectation derived from the discussion, is that China could find 
poorly governed countries more manageable and more easily influenced. 
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Put another way, strong institutions in countries possessing large abundance of oil can have a 
mitigating effect on Chinese aid allocation. Therefore, the third hypothesis is: 
 
H3 – Chinese aid allocation decrease if countries abundant on oil endowments also have 
strong institutional quality   
 
The Chinese will by this expectation not allocate more where institutional quality is strong and 
prefer poorly governed states. If institutional quality had increased Chinese aid, one could 
interpret China as acting as a conventional donor country seeking economic partnerships in 
Africa, where effective institutions are a conduit and stimulant to increasing economic activity 
because it lowers uncertainty and raise predictability (Ross et al. 2019, 575). In this case, 
assuming the Chinese merely seek to enter the market of the recipient country, corruption 
would be viewed more conventionally as “sand in the wheels of commerce”, scaring away 
implementing SOEs and government officials (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006, 808). 
 
The three hypotheses are derived from the donor country self-interest perspective in the 
conventional aid literature discussed in detail. Expectations are also based on the vehement 
debate around the characteristics of Chinese foreign aid. Based on the three theoretical 
perspectives (recipient need, recipient merit, and donor country self-interest), the goal of this 
thesis empirical analysis is to make models with three blocks of variables based on the three 
schools of thought: recipient need, recipient merit, and donor self-interest. The hypotheses 
focus on the long debate of scholars and pundits alike postulating that Chinese foreign aid is 
being allocated to African countries based on self-interest. With respect to recipient merit, it is 
interesting if there is a difference between western and Chinese foreign aid in allocation to 
countries with good governance. Whether China disregard recipient need comparison would 
aim to find a difference in altruistic aspect of foreign aid between China and OECD countries. 
 
The models therefore analyze three donors. With the most focus on China, models with the 
same assumptions are applied on foreign aid amounts from DAC countries in total and from 
the United States. Chinas foreign aid level is not substantially large compared to that of western 
donors (Bräutigam 2009, 307). Nevertheless, comparison is important in social science, and as 
will be discussed, the data applied is tailormade for comparing Chinese and Western flows. 
The three perspectives must be represented by variables corresponding to the concepts, but for 
the block measuring recipient merits (control of corruption) the idea is to interact this variable 
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with presence of oil abundance. As Schraeder, Hook and Taylor underscore, a common theme 
for aid allocation studies has been that competing paradigms dismiss alternative explanations 
and they recommend minimizing the competing perspectives in regression analysis (Schraeder, 
Hook and Taylor 1998, 299). But it is important to integrate several perspectives of explaining 
a phenomenon. If important explanatory variables based on central background insight are not 
included the robustness of cross-country statistical findings are insufficient (Kittel 2006, 651). 
As pointed out by McGillivray and White, donor country motives cannot be directly observed, 
but the means donors apply to pursue their motives can be. Explanatory models therefore 
mainly seek to explain characteristics with the developing country receiving the aid. The donor 
countries judge by these characteristics which developing countries they allocate their foreign 
aid toward (McGillivray and White 1993, 2-3). But before any empirical analysis, sufficient 
understanding of the phenomenon’s complex nature has to be acquired. The concept of foreign 
aid needs to be clear. 
 
 
6. Concepts, measures, and data 
The large concept of foreign aid is vulnerable to validity issues. The concept of foreign aid has 
to be considered in relation to the operationalization and measurements the data apply to 
represent the phenomenon. A common definition of foreign aid is as development assistance. 
OECD-DAC defines this as Official Development Assistance (ODA), “flows of official 
financing to developing countries provided by official agencies which have a clear 
development or anti-poverty purpose with a grant element is at least 25%” (Lum et al. 2009, 
1). ODA is most frequently used as the dependent variable because, broadly speaking, it is the 
decision variable for the donor (McGillivray and White 1993, 30). Therefore, the flow has to 
be a substantial subsidy from the government. This is also called a concessional flow. For non-
concessional loans and grants like export credits, foreign direct investment or military aid, the 
OECD uses the term Other Official Flows (OOF), which have a grant element of less than 25% 
(Brautigam 2011, 204; OECD glossary). The OOF category was articulated exactly to 
differentiate the grey areas between concessional from quasi-concessional flows, that “are 
developmental in character”, but fails to meet every ODA criterion (Oh 2020, 225). 
 
This definition is narrow and is already in danger of excluding other activities China conducts 
in Africa that apart from the major OECD donors would be considered development assistance. 
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The Chinese aid program is today a mixed bag of several instruments, which for the Chinese, 
is considered aid but not necessarily in line with the DAC definitions (Strange 2019, 261). 
Many analysts therefore believe the actual number of Chinese development assistance is much 
larger, but due to the narrow and rigid OECD definition, what is actual aid is measured as 
foreign direct investment rather than ODAs. This is why the numbers at our disposal must be 
interpreted with caution, and its limitations have to be thoroughly discussed (Lum et al. 2009, 
3). It is also important to distinguish between bilateral aid, between two countries, and 
multilateral aid, from international organizations like the World Bank. Parts of donor countries’ 
aid budgets go to these multilateral agencies (Yushi et al. 2020, 6). This analysis is therefore 
clearly limited to bilateral aid and does not seek to establish generalizations about multilateral 
development assistance. 
 
6.1. The difficulty of Chinese foreign aid as a concept  
One problem is Western countries and China understand the concept of foreign aid inherently 
differently. The Chinese will, for example, count export credits as foreign aid. OECD-DAC 
will not. It is sometimes difficult to see the distinction between Chinese aid, trade, and FDI, 
and aid is for example channeled through Chinese corporations thus blurring the line between 
concessional program aid and investments the Chinese government might be involved in 
(Kragelund 2008, 573; Sears 2019, 138; Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010, 863). 
 
Another problem in methodology that aims to resemble DAC standards is the large focus on 
monetary forms of foreign aid, like the value of grants and loans. However, many new donor 
countries have put a larger emphasis on non-monetary forms of foreign aid (Sears 2019, 141). 
The problem is that several aid projects with developmental intent from emerging donor 
countries are not registered in the data and not counted as foreign aid, which can be a problem. 
Medical aid and technical assistance for instance, would according to OECD definitions, not 
be counted as foreign aid. What constitutes as aid for the Chinese government is uncertain, but 
they certainly do not apply the same definitions as the OECD. What the OECD calls ODA is 
for the Chinese not distinguished from economic cooperation between Chinese firms and 
recipient firms, or some FDI projects, as long as the intent is to build projects in the receipt 
country (Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010, 863). China’s bilateral aid program is not in 
line with the standards and requirements the World Bank operate by. It gets even more 
complicated given the secrecy of their foreign aid program (Woods 2008, 1211). Chinas aid is 
mostly non-concessional, at least if seen through the OECD definitions, aimed at generating 
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returns for the Chinese government (DiLorenzo and Cheng 2019, 125). However, the Chinese 
government does not publish aid data like the donors of DAC are committed to doing (Bader 
2015b, 141). Therefore, comparing different donors is not unproblematic. Chinese aid activities 
are quite distinct from concepts of western aid, and inconsistency of what different donors 
understand as aid can make it hard to make comparisons (Markovtis, Strange and Tingley 2019, 
611). 
 
As will be discussed in the data part, scholars worry that a too broad concepts of Chinese 
foreign aid risk of including projects too liberally and ultimately leads to questionable 
conclusions. The warnings of Giovanni Sartori should be heeded. There are always tradeoffs 
when dealing with social phenomena between adding attributes to a concept which increase its 
validity but reduces the number observations applicable; and reducing attributes which increase 
the number of cases but increase the level of abstraction and risk of clouding the concepts 
internal validity. In the worst cases it can harm the credibility of a research design (Sartori 
1970, 1041). Moving up the ladder of generality, which is done here with use of a wide 
definition of Chinese foreign assistance, extends membership for more cases. However, in 
doing so, the cases lumped together in the same category might be so different that the 
comparisons are imprecise from the outset that they are unfit to represent the actual 
phenomenon in question (Collier and Mahon 1993, 846). Lack of transparent measures makes 
the Chinese numbers difficult to compare with those of the OECD countries. Nevertheless, in 
the absence of official data, there are few other alternatives. China has not given out any official 
definitions of what their aid flows mean or how the Chinese government delineates what they 
define as foreign aid. The Chinese does not make a clear distinction between development 
assistance and economic activities like investments (de Renzio and Seifert 2014, 1866). There 
is always a danger of overestimation and underestimation, depending on the amount of 
undisclosed information that is counted as concessional and included in datasets. According to 
Bräutigam, Chinese government financed development assistance falls into the grey area OOF, 
which is primarily export credits. Chinas main instruments for ODA are grants or loans with 
generous or zero interest rates (Bräutigam 2011, 204-205). 
Another problem is Chinese state-owned firms’ involvement in the aid program which makes 
it hard to distinguish the official finance from private group finance, and since project level 
data is classified by the Chinese government, there is no way to know for certain (DiLorenzo 
and Cheng 2019, 136). Involved are also several government ministries, like the Department 
of Foreign Aid and the Department of Commerce, controlling the budgets. The State Council 
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and the Ministry of Finance are responsible for the allocation. Nevertheless, there is no uniform 
or transparent policy on reporting (Strange et al. 2017, 7; Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010, 
864). Nevertheless, despite the involvement of several actors, the official policy is still very 
much under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Politburo Standing 
Committee. Chinese companies might be the implementers in recipient countries, but they tend 
to ask the Chinese government for direction and instructions to act in accordance with Chinese 
foreign policy (Brand, McEwen-Fial and Muno 2015, 11-12). 
 
The Chinese White Papers from 2011 and 2014 were the first pieces of official information on 
the Chinese foreign aid program (Kitano and Harada 2016, 1051). In the 2010-2012 period the 
Chinese government claim to have provided grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans 
adding up to USD 14.41 billion.  Activities mentioned are instruments like technical assistance, 
building materials, project aid, disaster relief humanitarian aid, medical assistance, and debt 
relief (White Paper 2014). But some scholars have speculated that the White papers only 
consider aid what originates from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the EximBank, 
leaving out development assistance from other government agencies (Kitano and Harada 2016, 
1052). Other notable attempts to quantify the actual number and amount of Chinese aid include 
Kitano and Hadada’s estimation, which combines concessional and non-concessional figures. 
They estimated the total Chinese foreign aid to be US$ 32.8 billion between 2011 and 2013 
(Kitano and Harada 2016, 1057). Dreher et al. (2017), the data used by this paper, have also 
found an estimate for the Chinese aid level. The number for total Chinese foreign assistance 
between the years 2000 and 2014, to 140 countries across five different regions, also including 
commitments, amounts to US$ 877.65 billion in their data. The total number of projects 
amounts to 5,466 (Dreher et al. 2017). This figure has been accused of being inflated; later this 
will be touched upon in more detail. 
 
6.1.1. Application of a liberal definition of foreign aid   
To capture the extent of the Chinese involvement in Africa it is vital to include concessional 
and non-concessional Chinese aid flows. The baseline definition of foreign aid in this thesis is 
therefore the wide concept presented by Arvin and Lew, who broadly define foreign as “the 
transfer of financial or other resources from richer countries to poorer ones that is intended to 
serve, first and foremost, the recipients’ interests, but which may also be used to pursue other 
objectives with political, strategic, or commercial imperatives” (Arvin and Lew 2015, 1). Most 
of China’s development assistance does not fall under the OECD-ODA category, therefore any 
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analysis on Chines foreign aid must also include OOF-like flows (Broich 2017, 184). The 
imprecise measurement of Chinese foreign aid is a problem and relies on the number of projects 
completed in a specific year and particular country. When measuring Chinese foreign aid, only 
small portions can be considered under the DAC definition of development assistance, which 
is why a comparison between Chinese foreign aid and western foreign aid has been considered 
very complicated (de Renzio and Seifert 2014, 1866).  
 
 
7. Data on Chinese aid 
There are data concerns with Chinese foreign aid. The preceding section makes this clear. 
There have been some attempts to collect data on foreign aid from emerging donors not 
conducting official reporting. Seeing as donor governments rarely declassify information of 
their foreign aid programs, alternative solutions to data collection have been applied. 
 
7.1. AidData’s Tracking Underreported Financial Flows 
The most promising dataset available is AidData’s Tracking Underreported Financial Flows 
(TUFF), collected for the period between 2000 and 2014. This data allows the researcher to 
differentiate between the repertoire of economic activities China might apply. Flow types are 
classified as “ODA-like activities” (Official Development Assistance), “OOF-like activities” 
(Other Official Flows), and for grey areas “Vague official flows” (Strange et al. 2015). The 
TUFF-dataset uses the term ODA-like flows for all grants, technical assistance and 
scholarships, loans with large grant elements, debt relief, and military aid with developmental 
intent (Sears 2019, 139; Strange et al. 2017, 10-11). This categorization of different types of 
aid makes it possible for researchers to make a more accurate analysis of the data and more 
fruitful for comparisons with OECD donors. Until this data became available, the studies on 
Chinese foreign aid had been mostly case studies, with some exceptions. 
 
The data collector used a media-based approach to compile Chinese aid projects. It is an open-
source methodology. The data collection strategy and triangulation processes are open for 
scholars, researchers, journalists, and experts, to scrutinize and improve. It is supposed to be 
replicable (Strange et al. 2017, 4). Earlier attempts to assemble data on Chinese aid using 
media-based data collection methodologies are Lum et al. (2009) and Wolf, Wang and Warner 
(2013). They depended on individual sources, did not have a transparent open methodology 
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approach, and did not take the same care with triangulation processes and input from other 
sources (Strange et al. 2013). But like Strange et al. (2017), their definition of aid was lamented 
for being too liberal and inclusive, which is similar to the criticism that the data of Strange et 
al. (2017) have received. The collection itself has used sources like aid information 
administrative services in the recipient countries; Chinese embassies, consulates, and 
commercial foreign economic offices; IMF reports; and a media database that analyzed 
“approximately 33,000 media outlets worldwide in 23 languages”. Such media-based 
approaches are popular in studies of events for which the data foundations are lacking. The raw 
data is usually relatively easy to acquire, and the replication methods are transparent, and with 
more sophisticated machine learning techniques, the field has been developing. Biases and 
miscounting occur with media approaches, as in any other data collection strategy. The danger 
of unstable data foundations increases as longer time periods are covered. Matching data 
sources is a popular solution to such issues, but if the variance between datasets is significantly 
large enough the flaws in the one dataset is reveal the flaws of the other (Woolley 2000, 171). 
Be that as it may, since there are no official numbers, there are only least-worst solutions to 
this estimation. However, media-based data methodology approaches as this have come under 
scrutiny. 
  
Since the focus of the TUFF data from the onset was based on commitments rather than 
disbursements the danger of overvaluing aid ever present (Kitano and Harada 2016, 1052). 
Bräutigam has criticized this data with what she describes as a “dicey” methodology using 
media sources that can lead to faulty conclusions. She takes issue with AidData’s TUFF-project 
not being based on expert opinions on China and that the assessment of what is aid must be 
done qualitatively by academics on the ground in Africa (Bräutigam 2013). The criticism is 
related to a central criticism of quantitative research; can it establish causal mechanisms, and 
does it fail to incorporate country-specific contextual factors? If so, it can skew the results. The 
main fallacy to avoid is to ontologically draw strong causally homogeneous inferences based 
on associations from this aggregated data. That is, one can be fairly certain that strong 
associations between variables are real and worthy of further research and investigation, but 
one also has to be extremely careful not to commit ecological fallacies. Moreover, this echoes 
what qualitative researchers have warned against regarding data on the macro level (Kittel 
2006, 648). Proponents of case-study approaches to foreign aid would point out that 
information researchers get from observations of causal processes and mechanisms largely 
gained from intensive qualitative studies are superior to establishing sequential causal 
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inferences and depend less on assumptions of independence between units (Mahoney 2010, 
124). However, notwithstanding these positivistic discussions’ importance for this field and 
the social sciences in general, it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess which approach is 
“the best”.  
 
Bias in media sources can originate for two reasons. First, it can be an error with the sources 
themselves, mistakes or just misinformation. The researcher disseminating and collecting this 
information can ultimately do nothing about this on each individual source, but they can for 
the sake of transparency map out where the source is uncertain and make assessments on 
omission. This thesis has taken this into account and made such an assessment. Second, the 
coding process applied to systemize the data will have huge implications for the validity. One 
challenge with media sources across several different countries is that operational definitions 
of a concept will have contrasting meanings depending on where it is applied. While getting 
this right provides comparability, the issue of validity persists (Huxtable and Pevehouse 1996, 
14-15; Sears 2019, 137). As mentioned, Bräutigam has criticized the TUFF data for both these 
pitfalls:  for defining broad deals of bilateral economic cooperation as loans; and for 
overvaluing projects, specifically megadeals in Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Ghana among 
others. The crux of the critique is that applying far too liberal definitions of Chinese foreign 
aid, simply includes all activities where the Chinese government is involved (Bräutigam 2013). 
This predicament of overly wide definitions is common in the social sciences, as discussed in 
the concept part. All research designs need to keep issues like conceptual stretching in mind 
and be cautious in interpreting the results of empirical analysis. Nevertheless, since the Chinese 
do not define or understand aid the same way as the OECD, there are some justifications for 
operationalizing concepts liberally. Markovtis, Strange and Tingley recommended avoiding 
too narrow definitions of foreign aid allocation, and rather apply definitions that cover several 
sectors. They also warn against not including non-ODA flows, particularly from new donors, 
because not doing so risk not fully capturing full donor intentions (Markovtis, Strange and 
Tingley 2019, 612). Kragelund agrees with such perspectives, stressing that it is important to 
map out the characteristics of emerging donors aid allocation when comparing them to DAC 
donors, even if the definition of aid is wider than the OECD concepts. This is because it matters 
how it affects the recipients as much as aid from traditional donors (Kragelund 2008, 576-577). 
 
The authors of the TUFF-data do try to increase the reliability of their data by matching them 
with other sources through a triangulation process that attempts to falsify the existence and 
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status of projects and ensure the accuracy of the data. This triangulation uses search engines; 
media reports; government documents; IMF, World Bank and African Devolvement Bank 
documents; and press briefings. This cross-referencing is useful to omit unreliable project 
sources, uncover major deviations from other sources, bridge gaps in the data, and to 
investigate each project deeper. There are also several computational filtering procedures and 
personal vetting processes to eliminate duplicate records and weed out miscategorizations. The 
TUFF-methodology track flows from Chinese agencies and ministries, provincial 
governments, embassies, the China Development Bank, EXIM Bank, state-owned commercial 
banks, and state-owned firms (Strange et al. 2017). This research design takes these concerns 
to account and is therefore relatively conservative when applying the data for research, which 
will be elaborated on later. 
 
The project’s funding has to originate from the government. The units of analysis are Chinese 
projects in African countries between the years 2000 and 2014. The data cover both Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF). So-called umbrella projects 
are projects where a bilateral agreement has been reached, but no funds have been transferred 
on the agreed-upon date and disbursement comes later. These projects have been excluded from 
the analysis because these flows often actually befall at a later point in time and might have 
been captured by coding as other registered projects earlier. For example, flows from large 
mega deals might not arrive at the original date agreed upon, and the actual disbursement of 
funds might arrive years later than the commitment (official agreement of aid). It can also be 
compartmentalized into several subprojects. This is potentially a problem since China has also 
been known to rehabilitate former abandoned projects later than the commitment agreements 
are planned (Kragelund 2008, 574). One project might therefore be captured several times. 
Their inclusion raises the danger of double-couniting (Strange et al. 2017, 5). Rehabilitated 
projects are hard to track. Umbrella projects are therefore not included in our data.  
 
7.2. Case selection 
The units of analysis are 52 African countries, and observations are country-years for their aid 
allocation. The data has been aggregated from 1372 Chinese developmental assistance projects 
in Africa after removing umbrella projects, and the remaining units marked not recommended 
for research. Some observations have multiple countries as recipients, which have been 
removed. Countries that do not show up in the TUFF data have been added in the linear 
probability model. These are Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Eswatini. They have been marked 
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with the value zero on the binary aid variable. That the aid from China was zero to these 
countries is considered a safe assumption, which will be touched upon later. This leaves the 
number of observations at 773 for the linear probability model and 471 country-years on the 
second step OLS models.  
The data are commitments, excluding pledges and canceled or suspended projects. The flows 
of Chinese aid are put into amount of the deflated monetary equivalent value in 2014 US 
dollars, and each project has been aggregated for each year for each country. When specifying 
that the data are commitments, it means excluding pledges, canceled or suspended projects. 
For aggregation, it is therefore important that only the agreements that have reached the official 
commitment stage are counted, and not merely pledges that can be cancelled. That means only 
officially committed projects (usually pipelines), completed projects, or projects under 
implementation (Dreher et al. 2017, 2; Strange et al. 2017, 13). Cancelled, suspended, and the 
mentioned umbrella projects are excluded. In other words, this aggregated data is official 
commitment aid. In other words, this aggregated data is official commitment aid. The countries 
and the amount allocated to them is shown in Figure 2. There is a skewed distribution of aid 
values. As Figure 2 shows, while there is quite a variation in the distribution, Chinas aid is 
highly skewed toward a few countries. Since there is a skewed distribution of countries 
receiving large and smaller amounts of development assistance, the aid variable will have to 
be log-transformed to avoid disturbance from extreme values. In foreign aid studies, aid 




It has been a dispute among researchers of whether aid commitments or disbursements are the 
most cautious and best way to measure the phenomenon. Disbursements are actual international 
transfers of financial resources from donor to recipient, while commitments are obligations 
expressed in an agreement concerning the funds intended for transfer from donor to the 
recipient (McGillivray and White 1993, 32). On the one hand, the aid commitment variable 
better reflects the donor decision. Commitments should represent donor decisions better 
because governments have direct control over their commitments, as opposed to disbursements 
which depend on the capacity and ability of the recipient country to administratively receive 
the money (Berthélemy 2006a, 180-181; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004, 244). Furthermore, 
commitments are usually not affected by shocks like natural disasters or political crisis. 
Disbursements can be affected by this. Often the donor will give more during disasters, or less 
in case of a political crisis if certain conditions are not sufficiently being met (McGillivray and 
White 1993, 33). But on the other hand, since commitments are plans for projects over multiple 
years, it is not safe to treat what happens a year isolated from what happens next year. 
Commitments are the donor committing financial support and the recipient committing to meet 
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certain demands, and the actual disbursement of flows is contingent on this (Davies and Klasen 
2019, 256-257). For example, if a recipient hypothetically recognizes Taiwan post-
commitment, it is safe to assume China would cancel all disbursements regardless of what the 
bilateral agreement originally entailed. However, if the interest is donor intent like in this thesis, 
it matters how much the donor measures its commitment to allocate in gross terms, which is 
what commitment is. Disbursements are the outcome of the commitment (McGillivray and 
White 1993, 32). Therefore, aid commitments are preferred for these purposes.  
 
7.3. The dependent variable: Chinese foreign aid  
The dependent variable for this analysis is therefore the amount of Chinese aid commitments, 
including ODA-like, OOF-like and vague official flows. ODA-like flows are those that would 
qualify as Official Development Assistance and must be official financing. It also has to be 
administered with the intent of promoting economic development in developing countries and 
its grant element has to be at least 25% concessional. This includes grants, technical assistance, 
interest-free loans, in-kind contributions of goods and services and debt relief (Strange et al. 
2017, 10). In the strictest sense, this is the only variable one can call developmental aid, at least 
according to the OECD definitions. This echoes the concerns Bruätigam and others have raised 
about too inclusive concepts. However, if one wants to capture commercial as well as 
humanitarian aspects of Chinese financial assistance to Africa, the less concessional, and as we 
have seen, increasingly prevalent category of other official flows should also be included.  
 
OOF-like flows are official finance that does not adequately meet the ODA criteria of 
concessionality. The grants to developing countries are mainly commercial rather than 
developmental. The grant element is less than 25%. This often includes export credits, 
acquisition by government institutions of securities, subsidies to the private sector, and funds 
that support private investment (Strange et al. 2017, 10).  
The Chinese amount of aid flows have been deflated in constant US dollars with 2014 as the 
base year and has also been adjusted for local currency fluctuations and unstable exchange 
rates (Strange et al. 2017, 5). The amount has been displayed in thousands in order to make the 
estimates more interpretable and to counteract the problems caused by skewness. The variable 
being skewed means that Chinese foreign aid to Africa is very unbalanced in allocation toward 
recipients receiving large amounts of aid compared to those receiving nothing or very little. 
This is displayed in the Appendix B. A skewed value on the outcome variable is a huge problem 
for model assumptions and fitting and can lead to faulty results (Russell and Dean 2000, 167). 
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Therefore, the even bigger step to mitigate these issues of skewness on the dependent variable, 
the most appropriate solution is to transform it to not bias the slope but ensure a more normal 
distribution. This can reduce problems of heteroskedasticity and improve model fitting. The 
choice is to take the logarithmic function of the positive values of Chinese foreign aid, which 
assumes no values are zero or below (Stolzenberg 2004, 195). The interpretation of this 
variable is straightforward, where the logarithmic function only on Y can be read as Y’s 
percentage increase by a one unit increase on X. This variable is for an elementary Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis of the monetary amount of Chinese foreign aid run in 
three different models. But this is a two-step approach, so before the models on the positive 
amounts are put to use, a model with the binary value of aid-no aid is presented in a linear 
probability model (LPM). 
 
In the first step of the empirical analysis, for the LPM-model Chinese aid will be coded as a 
binary variable, determining if China allocate aid or no aid a given year. This is the first step 
in the two-step approach of this analysis, following what Berthélemy (2006a) applied in respect 
to western countries. Some projects in TUFF from Dreher et al. (2017) have multiple sources 
and detailed information and are deemed recommended for research, but the monetary amount 
is missing. The coding rules decided by the author and applied assume the years not having 
registered any aid commitments by the TUFF data triangulation collection methodology are 
years with no aid allocation in reality as well. The assumption is that the data will have 
registered all commitments a given year, even though the USD amount is missing. For this 
binary aid variable, a year with no commitments recorded is coded as zero, while all years with 
a commitment registered are coded as 1. 
 
For the second step-model with the positive aid amounts’ variable, only the observations with 
a monetary amount a given year and that is marked as recommended for research are included. 
The years where no aid commitments have been recorded and the years where aid commitments 
were recorded but are missing USD amounts, are not coded as a year with zero amounts of aid. 
They are coded as a non-applicable (NA). Put simply, the commitments that have recorded aid 
amounts and are recommended for research are the units of analysis. The assumption made 
about the data is that non-recorded aid flows are missing at random, meaning that missing or 
non-missing values are mostly dependent on observed values of variables and not unobserved 
values on variables being missing (Sorens and Ruger 2012, 430). The probability that the value 
of an observation being missing is therefore assumed to only depend on available information. 
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If the values are missing at random it is relatively safe to code them as non-applicable. It is 
even safer in logistical models where the researcher can code observed cases as 1 and non-
observed cases as a 0 (Gelman and Hill 2007, 530). This is what will be done for the first step 
in the linear probability model, while in the second step with series of OLS models the units of 
analysis are only positive aid amounts in USD. Non-recorded cases which could be considered 
zeros are coded as NA. The first step of the analysis aims to observe how the variable 
determines receiving aid or no aid at all. But this first step and the binary values of aid cannot 
say anything about how much aid is allocated in monetary amounts. To show the association 
between the amount of aid allocated and the independent variables selected for this analysis, 
the second step model with the positive aid amounts is presented.  
 
7.4. The explanatory variables  
The independent variables are selected to be representing the three major perspectives of donor 
allocation behavior that have been discussed in detail: recipient need, recipient merit and donor 
self-interest. The variables are categorized under these three perspectives, while it is essential 
to note potential overlaps between perspectives, particularly when it comes to China. Control 
of corruption and democracy are traditionally associated with recipient merit, as discussed, 
they are oft cited conditionalities recipients have to perform well under. But some theories 
assert it is in Chinas self-interest to be biased against good governance and democracy. There 
is a western bias in this research framework, but it systemizes these concepts adequality, so 
with this in mind the variables are summarized hereunder. 
 
7.4.1. Variables representing donor self-interest 
The first independent variable is for the first hypothesis (H1) and is DAC aid three-year 
decrease. For OECD-DAC aid the data has been excerpted from OECD statistics databank. For 
total aid commitments, the OECD database defines “A commitment is a firm written obligation 
by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary 
funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and 
conditions” and “are considered to be made at the date a loan or grant agreement is signed or 
the obligation is otherwise made known to the recipient” (OECD Glossary 2015, 340). This 
variable represents the response aid leading to H1, where a long-term decrease in development 
assistance from DAC should signal to Chinese policymakers that the west has been 
withdrawing and the recipient is open to receive aid from alternative donors. If China seeks to 
fill a potential power vacuum, more Chinese aid is expected to be allocated under long-term 
 51 
DAC aid decrease. The variable DAC total aid commitment number is an aggregate measure 
of ODA-activities like grants, as well as OOF-activities like associated financing, technical 
cooperation, loans, and other long term capital investments. It is displayed in thousand and in 
constant USD with 2019 as the base year. This is the same measure that will be used as the 
dependent variable on analyzing DAC aid to Africa, and bilateral US aid to Africa, after 
analyzing the data from TUFF. The assumption is that three-year differences are sufficient and 
appropriate as a measure of whether DAC members are considerably long-term subsiding its 
activity in a country. To make the result more interpretable, DAC aid three-year difference is 
coded a as dummy variable. If DAC aid to a recipient shows a three-year decrease it is coded 
as 1, and if there is a positive change it is zero. Earlier studies like Morgan (2018) controlled 
for this with counting number of DAC projects, but this thesis choose to take account on the 
amounts of USD of DAC assistance instead of number of projects. It is aid commitments from 
OECD statistics that in the final part of the empirical analysis will be employed as the 
dependent variable on the same models applied to Chinese aid, although these will have its 
original continuous values and will be from the total of DAC countries and from the United 
States.  
 
The second independent variable is oil abundance, and four different proxies have been used 
to represent it. One as the selected main explanatory variable, and three more as robustness 
checks. First, Oil production is the selected main measure to represent oil abundance in a 
country. It is measured as oil production in metric tons and is from the dataset of Michael Ross, 
although the raw data mainly originated from the US Geological Survey (USGS) and the World 
Bank. The weight varies depending on the quality of the crude oil. The data is mainly from the 
US Geological Survey (USGS) and the World Bank. Missing values for certain countries and 
years was filled from sources like the statistical yearbooks from the British Petroleum 
Company (BP) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (Ross and Mahdavi 
2015). Because of this variable’s inherent skewness, it has been transformed into a binary 
threshold variable. This will be elaborated further after all measures representing oil abundance 
have been presented and visualized in FIGURE 3 and FIGURE 4. This is the variable 
introduced in the first models and the only one subject to the interaction effect. The subsequent 
three measures for oil abundance will be used as robustness checks on Hypotheses 2.  
 
The first alternative measure is Crude oil reserves, in billions and including lease condensate. 
The data originate from the EIA statistics. Reserves means that the oil is considered to be a 
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recoverable asset at the year recorded, therefore it is understood as a country’s potential oil 
abundance in the future. China might cultivate a good relationship with countries that might 
become petrostates in the future (Lee 2019, 582) Crude oil (including lease condensate 
reserves) is defined as “A mixture of hydrocarbons that exists in liquid phase in natural 
underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing through 
surface separating facilities” (EIA Glossary 2021). Crude oil can be refined into several 
petroleum products, like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, propane, asphalt, and heating oil among many 
others. One issue related to endogeneity is that a country’s energy production can be affected 
by increased Chinese influence. However, Lee points out that China is relatively new in the 
global energy market and gaining substantial influence is unlikely (2019, 582). Crude oil 
reserves is also transformed into a benchmarked variable with a threshold. This will be detailed 
further below.   
 
As a second alternative measure, also Oil production value in 2014 US dollars has been 
included. This has by Michael Ross been computed from BP Statistics to its nominal value and 
adjusted for inflation with 2014 as its base year (Ross and Mahdavi 2015). It is 
straightforwardly understood as representing the monetary value of the oil. To mitigate 
skewness, this also transformed to the values annual change.  
The third alternative measure for oil abundance is Oil rents as a percentage of GDP. It is from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) and measures ‘the difference between the value of 
crude oil production at regional prices and total costs of production’. This estimate of rent 
differences is between the price of the oil and the average cost of its production, relative to the 
physical quantities of countries extraction or harvest as a share of nominal GDP (World Bank, 
World Development Indicators, 2020). Oil rents are therefore understood as the weighted 
average efficiency of the oil sector in monetary terms.  
 
To summarize, oil abundance is consequently tested in total with four different measures. Oil 
production is the weight of the production output; Crude oil reserves is the amount of extricable 
barrels in the ground; Oil production value as the monetary value of the country’s oil 
production; and finally with Oil rents monetary efficiency by the estimated difference between 
domestic production cost and the value on the global market. All the variables representing oil 
abundance have been lagged by one year to reduce the dangers of reverse causality. Current 
aid flows cannot be a function of current variables that are known to be time dependent 
(McGillivray and White 1993, 62). Lagging the explanatory variables is a widely applied and 
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relatively safe solution in order to avoid reverse causality and endogeneity. The methodological 
problem with petroleum endowments, however, is skewness and lack of normal distribution, 
with some countries having enormous quantities and others having nothing. This is displayed 
geographically with Crude oil reserves on FIGURE 3 and with Oil production on FIGURE 4. 




Several countries having the value zero also means that the variables cannot be logged. The 
solution to this is to make a benchmark for the countries having a lot of oil with a dichotomous 
measure. Borrowing the solution from Bader (2015b, 146), the variables measuring the amount 
of oil have been transformed into binary benchmark variables for the sample of African 
countries’ 70th percentile. For Oil production this corresponds to countries on or above the level 
298800 million metric tons per year having the value 1, and for Crude oil reserves the value 1 
is assigned for all observations on or above 15.000.000 barrels per year. It increases the 
standard errors of the variables and deprive the estimates of much information, but it solves the 
issue of skewness on the dependent variable. The choice has been made to let the monetary 
proxies of oil abundance stay continuous and let the benchmarks only apply to the proxies 
measuring Oil production and Crude oil reserves. In Appendix B, the comparison of the 
skewness between the non-transformed variables and the distribution after the benchmark 
makes them binary is displayed.  
The remaining variables presented are control variables, as well as Control of corruption which 
will need additional elaboration. Variables representing self-interest, recipient merit and 
recipient need are follows hereunder.  
 
Self-interest has also often been represented by voting alignment with the donor country in the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), assuming China reward African countries voting 
in alignment with them (Dreher et al. 2011, 1951; Morgan 2018, 220). This UNGA voting 
alignment agreement score is a dyadic measure of the ideal point distance between countries 
preferences in the general assembly and is also adjusted for temporal agenda changes from the 
cold war till the 21st century in order to “consistently capture the position of states vis-à-vis a 
US-led liberal order (Bailey et al. 2017, 438). The logic dictates then that China favors those 
counties voting in line with them in the UN General assembly. United Nations preference 
similarity have during the last few years been recognized as important predictors for Chinese 
aid allocation. Dreher et al. found that Chinese concessional ODA aid flows had a strong 
positive relationship with UN voting alignment and recipient not recognizing and did not find 
evidence that their ODA-like flows targeted natural resource rich countries nor any relationship 
with institutional quality (2018, 191). Unlike Dreher et al. restrict voting alignment on 




Another variable associated with donor country self-interest is to proxy bilateral strength of 
trade between the recipient country and donor country. The allocation will here be directed 
more heavily towards those countries with a trade relationship with the donor country and 
might be even stronger if the aid is tied which imply more imports (Berthélemy and Tichit 
2004, 257). The trade interest of the donor country can be important in the way that growth 
enhancing measures like financial aid can alleviate economic difficulties in the developing 
country. The assumption here is that aid that for instance build or modernize infrastructure 
would strengthen the profitability of export trade (Lee 2019, 578; Maizels and Nissanke 1984, 
884). Aid has in the literature and in research been found to be an apparent stimulant for 
increased investment and trade (Kragelund 2008, 579). Liu and Tang found that both bilateral 
imports and exports have a clear positive effect on Chinese foreign aid (2018, 63). More trade 
linkages with the donor country should promote more foreign aid to the recipient. The proxy 
representing bilateral trade chosen is export. Exports from China to African countries are 
measured using data from the Comtrade Word Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. Its 
value is displayed in thousands and measured in constant USD. Since this variable is very 
skewed, it is also transformed to the yearly change of export value for a more normal 
distribution.  
 
7.4.2. Variables representing recipient merit 
What is regarded as Chinas only official conditionality to its potential pool of recipients is 
whether or not the country recognizes what is officially named the Republic of China (ROC) – 
and more commonly known as Taiwan, and it seems to be the only condition in which China 
discriminates in bilateral cooperation in the event of non-compliance (Kaestner 2010, 3). 
Taiwan recognition is a binary variable, being 1 if the country has formal diplomatic relations 
with the Republic of China (ROC) – Taiwan, and 0 if it does not recognize Taiwan. The data 
on which countries recognize Taiwan and those that do not up till 2007 was emulated from 
Bräutigam (2011, 209-210), and gaps or time periods after this rest was coded by the author 
from various sources, but mainly supplied from Rich (2009, 168) and Rich and Banerjee (2015, 
147). 
 
The preferred proxy to represent good governance is the control of corruption index by Daniel 
Kaufmann as part of the World Banks’ World Governance Indicators (WGI). Higher values on 
this index indicate that the there is a higher degree of control of corruption in the country. WGI 
indicators for political and governmental institutional quality are common to employ in studies 
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of foreign aid allocation surveying recipient’s background conditions (Brunnschweiler 2008, 
404; Yushi et al. 2020, 14). The control of corruption estimates measures “perceptions of 
corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain”. It is ideal 
for measuring misuse of public power appropriation of public goods for private gain (World 
Development Indicators, The World Bank). It measures computed values of data from several 
sources, ranging from perceptions of how to get things done by bribes or corruption in business 
and politics. The weighted average of the different measures for corruption are combined into 
one unique index and the final estimate is computed by the variance in the distribution in order 
to further precise this measure (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006, 812; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, 45-46). The 
advantage is that it employs a survey-based unified metric on perceived corruption from a wide 
variety of countries, which makes several cases comparable, while some contextual 
information is still lost (Gerring 2012, 185). 
 
In almost every foreign aid study there is a problem with reverse causality. Poorer countries 
might receive more foreign aid, but this does not mean that aid causes poverty, but that the 
poor countries are being targeted. The same goes in regard to institutions: more foreign aid to 
countries with poor institutions does not mean that this causes poor institutions, but that that 
they try to improve the recipient’s institutions. However, regarding corruption, it is different. 
As Alesina and Weder point out “it is hard to argue that aid should go to more corrupt countries 
to help reduce corruption. Therefore, if one finds that governments that are more corrupt 
receive more foreign aid, one could safely interpret this finding as a failure in the decision 
process allocating aid amongst developing countries”. As discussed earlier in the debate on 
DAC conditionality-tied aid, donors are supposed not to incentivize corruption in recipient 
countries, requiring them to commit to establishment strong institutions of horizontal 
accountability. High degrees of corruption then should by conventional wisdom mean less 
foreign aid. A weakness with corruption proxies, however, is that they often are correlated with 
many other characteristics with countries (Alesina and Weder 2002, 1127-1128). There are also 
pitfalls with the validity of the index. There is a danger that an index for institutional quality 
put together by six different indicators with different questions might obscure the conceptual 
clarity, and by implication the validity of the measure. Since these phenomena could correlate 
it is hard to determine whether the answers are mutually independent (Gerring 2012, 185; 
Heywood 2015, 140). The surveys, computation methods and conceptual baselines used are 
from a World Bank standard and does have an inherent goal in uncovering private sector 
corruption and growth inhibiting patronage networks (Gerring 2012, 186). That is problematic 
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given that corruption by OECD and World Bank standards is not universally applicable. What 
western analysts would characterize as “deviation from the norm”, are practices that are quite 
common in developing countries to a varying degree. However, western standards (or any 
standard) are a necessary, if imperfect, point of departure for studying such phenomena. After 
all, while different enforcement of rules depends on government, all countries does have a 
distinction between private and public, and all countries have a standard somewhere on what 
is legitimate activity or not (Cremer 2008, 58). 
 
Another traditional merit variable is Democracy. To distinguish if the African country in 
question is a democracy, the Boix-Miller-Rosato dichotomous measure of democracy is 
employed. Even though one loses some information with dichotomous measures, it does solve 
some issues regarding inference on how to assess increases compared to decreases, and it also 
makes sense if the assumption is that China has an interest in favoring non-democracies. This 
keeps the measure simple and easily interpretable. There are two concrete standards that require 
fulfillment: a country gets coded as 1, meaning democratic, if both contestation and 
participation are sufficiently fulfilled, otherwise it gets coded as 0, meaning it is non-
democratic (Boix, Miller and Rosato 2013, 1528). 
 
7.4.3. Variables representing recipient need  
Recipient need in monetary terms has often been proxied with GDP per capita where the poorer 
countries will receive more than the richer countries (Berthélemy 2006a, 184; Schraeder, Hook 
and Taylor 1998, 304). The variable GDP per capita applied here originate from the United 
Nations Statistics Division and covers all countries for the period covered in this study. The 
values have by the author been adjusted for inflation through average CPI with 2014 as the 
base year. The direction of GDP per capita is theoretically ambivalent. Developing countries 
can have quite free economies and show potential for future returns, but Chinese enterprises 
will also want to invest in predictable and safe environments more associated with developed 
countries (Bader 2015b, 146). This is also true with respect to foreign investments, separate 
but related to the foreign aid literature. Researchers focusing on Chinese FDI have found that 
the partner countries market size and GDP growth are highly significant determinants for the 
Chinese to invest in the country, but also the larger the size of ethnic Chinese population in the 
partner country attract Chinese investors (Buckley et al. 2007, 512; Cheung et al. 2012, 217). 
Yushi et al. 2020 found that Chinese aid flowed more toward African states with higher per 
capita GDP implying the Chinese allocate more to economically well performing countries 
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(Yushi et al. 2020, 17). China themselves, in their 2014 white paper, claims to target low-
income developing countries in an effort to achieve The Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) (White Paper 2014), suggesting that they consider low GDP per capita as an indicator 
for the neediness of a potential recipient. This is corroborated by Dreher and Fuchs (2015), 
who also found that the Chinese partly target countries with low per capita income (Dreher and 
Fuchs 2015, 1019). 
 
A second proxy representing recipient need is the Infant mortality rate of the recipient country, 
and the measure reveals particularly the performance of social policies. As a proxy for recipient 
needs, the infant mortality rate in the recipient country is used, which is an orthodox measure 
of the performance of social policies that has been used in similar research earlier (Berthélemy 
and Tichit 2004, 260). The infant mortality rate is the most widely available indicator for the 
general health status of a country’s population, in the absence of data on the prevalence of 
diseases. It is also a reliable measure of a country’s socioeconomic development that is 
arguably the best suited for comparison across countries. A high rate of infants dying relative 
to the population implies low priority or cuts in the health and social sectors. Also, failing a 
rudimentary task in ensuring the survival of infants serves as an indication of low fiscal 
capacity and ineptitude of provision of services beyond these sectors (Shandra, Shandra and 
London 2012, 197). Infant mortality rate from the World Development Indicators (WDI) is 
measured as the weighted average of infants per 1000 live births dying before reaching the age 
of one in a given year (World Development Indicators, The World Bank 2021). Its usefulness 
lies in the fact that it is a non-monetary measure of poverty and recipient need, but it is also a 
measure for state capacity, institutional quality, and inequality of social policies (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2009, 678; Costanza et al. 2015, 286).  
 
7.4.4. Alternative variables and western aid 
As a robustness test, some alternations on the dependent variable are required. There is a 
question of whether a larger population means a higher degree of recipient need which could 
warrant more aid allocation (McKinlay and Little 1977, 65). In the late 1960s, the so-called 
small country effect/bias was first discovered (McGillivray and White 1993, 15-16). 
Population size is usually assumed to mean more aid allocation as it both can be a need as 
populous countries are often poor, and self-interest as it can mean there are potential for large 
and stimulating markets to invest in (Bader 2015b, 146; Maizels and Nissanke 1984, 881). 
There are other ways to control for population, mainly by computing it into an aid per capita 
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variable. Since population can both be interpreted as recipient need for aid, and donor self-
interest in the recipient’s presumptive political importance, it is an ambiguous measure. To 
address these concerns then, total aid per capita should be interpreted more as a measure of 
recipient need when one adjusts the total aid level for the population of the receiving country 
(McGillivray and White 1993, 10). The dependent variables transformation into Chinese aid 
per capita will be tested as an extra robustness check. 
 
Because the models will also be applied to western and US aid, some alternative variables are 
also used. Bilateral variables like UNGA agreement scores and export data from WITS for the 
United States have also been integrated into these models, so the tests done on Chinese aid will 
also be done on US aid. As a substitute for the binary conditionality that is for China 
represented by African countries stance on Taiwan recognition, the either-or-situation of 
whether the recipient country has signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
is introduced. Signing the treaty recognizing the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) is a conditionality that the United States and western liberal democracies in general have 
encouraged African countries to in order to strengthen human rights and enhance accountability 
for a continent plagued by civil war and human rights infringements (Gilligan 2006, 942; 
Johansen 2006, 305). Since United States (while refusing to sign themselves) and western 
democracies have pressured African countries to sign this treaty, this is here considered as the 
closest western equivalent to a binary conditionality like the Taiwan recognition variable is. 
Signatory countries receive the value 1, while non-signatories are coded as 0. TABLE 1 
summarizes the variables this thesis will be using.  
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TABLE 1 – Measurements of variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Source 
Chinese aid 
(2014 deflated) 









8,197.613 23,115.600 0.000 131,000 Michael Ross 
Oil value (2014 
dollars) 
4,411,405.000 13,874,846.000 0.000 107,935,820.000 Michael Ross 
Oil rents 
 




61.837 27.028 11.800 141.900   World Development 
Indcators (WDI) 
Democracy 
dichotomous   




-0.625 0.594 -1.869   1.217 Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
GDP per capita 
(2014 CPI) 




0.887 0.151 0.000 1.000 Bailey, Strezhnev, 
and Voeten 2017 
Taiwan 
recognition 
0.103   0.304 0 1 Bräutigam 2011; 
Rich 2009 
DAC Total Aid 
commitments 
584,816,859.000 778,988,340.000 0.000 12,028,560,000 OECD Statistics 
Exports, WITS 757,967.300 1,823,587.000 0.000 16,830,776.000 The World Integrated 
Trade Solution 




As mentioned, the preferred models are those incorporating variables from several schools of 
thought. For example, models separating recipient need and donor self-interest are 
methodologically flawed because they suffer from specification errors due to the omission of 
relevant variables. If one accepts the consensus that both altruistic and self-interest reasons 
motivate the allocation of foreign aid, then one also accepts that separated models are 
misspecified (McGillivray and White 1993, 36-37). Case studies of foreign aid have the 
weakness of being unable to generalize across several donors. A case study would also be in 
the danger of making the particular case depend on one particular theoretical perspective 
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(Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998, 301). As have been discussed throughout, the purpose of 
this thesis is to not be limited to one school but incorporate three conventional perspectives 
systematizing the schools of thought of the foreign aid allocation literature while also tailoring 
this framework to what can be expected if the donor country is China. The most appropriate 
and preferred way to do this is through a time-series-cross-section regression analysis, or what 
is also called panel data. There are several advantages with applying a panel data structure. It 
can mitigate problems tied to confounders and heterogeneity and it is a practical method if the 
interest are general trends over time and space (Dougherty 2016, 529; Imai 2017, 60; Petersen 
2004, 331). 
 
8.1. Two-step solution to the empirical analysis 
This analysis aims to not be deterministic, for example in claiming that oil endowments 
necessarily lead to more Chinese aid. It does aim to make probabilistic claims in the sense that 
the expectation is that more petroleum endowments increase the likelihood of more Chinese 
aid to African countries (Lieberson 1991, 309). What needs to be acknowledged, is the inherent 
danger that measurement errors or theoretical indeterminacy between the concept and the 
phenomenon which might introduce empirical deviations. Therefore, deterministic statements 
are inappropriate in this case. The statistical inferences that are drawn here are therefore of 
associations between Chinese aid and determinants, not of causality. The analysis follows the 
footsteps of Berthélemy (2006a). That means this will be conducted in a two-part approach, 
two different stages employing two different regression models. While Berthélemy focused on 
Western donors of foreign aid, the two-step procedure resembling his approach will be applied 
to Chinese foreign aid. The upside with this solution is that it analyzes foreign aid allocation 
through two different operationalizations on the dependent variable: first with a binary aid-no 
aid variable focusing on all countries that received some form of aid and those that received 
nothing, before the second step analyze the positive monetary USD amounts which include 
only on the allocation to the recipients that actually received foreign aid. In this thesis, step one 
is a linear probability model (LPM) with a binary dependent aid variable. Step two are OLS 
models only using the values of the Chinese aid variable that are continuous and positive.   
 
8.1.1. Step one: Linear probability model 
Step one will employ a binary dependent variable of Chinese aid. Countries either receive aid, 
and are coded as 1, or receive no aid, and are be coded as 0. All 15 years for all 52 countries 
will be represented in this model because the sample is simply based on aid or no aid. Instead 
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of a probit-model, which Berthélemy applied, this analysis uses a linear probability model 
(LPM). That means that a linear regression model employs a dependent variable that is 
dichotomous and regression estimates vary between 0 and 1 and it is interpreted as a probability 
estimate of an outcome occurring. The output can be negative probabilities, and there is a 
debate whether negative probability values are valid, because the concept of a negative 
probability is undefinable. (Aldrich and Nelson 1984, 13). This is due to the linear relations of 
the predictors to the binary variable. In cases of negative probability, the estimate is commonly 
interpreted as zero. The probability of this outcome, receiving foreign aid from China, are in 
these kinds of models assumed to be a linear function of the explanatory variables. The model 
aims to determine linearly what the probability of receiving foreign aid from China is. 
 
There are defects with the linear probability models, most notably with the disturbance term of 
the outcome variable (Y) have just two specific values. The distribution is therefore not normal 
and stands at risk of being heteroskedastic (Dougherty 2016, 369). The error terms, the 
difference between the observed and predicted estimate, in models using dichotomous 
variables are not normally distributed which in principle is a violation of regression analysis 
assumptions (Knoke, Bohrnstedt and Potter Mee 2002, 298). Simply put, the assumption of 
linearity is not realistic for predictor values. For these reasons the LPM model will only be 
applied in the first step of the analysis, but it is preferred here due to its simplicity.  
 
Problems with LPM notwithstanding, even critical researchers concur that linear probability 
models are very useful in gaining an insight of trends and direction of the variables at the early 
stages of an analysis (Amemiya 1981, 1487). What Beck, Katz, and Tucker call cross-section 
data with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS) essentially is grouped event history data of an 
occurrence or no occurrence, like aid allocation or no aid allocation. In logit and probit-models 
it requires the correct assumption of temporal independence, otherwise statistical tests might 
fail or be misleading (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1261). The assumptions for linear 
probability models are less restrictive. Linear probability models can in some cases also be 
more appropriate if the dummy variable represents group membership, and logit and probit-
models are unsuited to estimate observations of groups making the same choice (Caudill 1988, 
426; Caudill 1987, 381). 
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8.1.1.1. LPMs solution to the issue of perfect separation  
With respect to the Taiwan recognition variable which theoretically is supposed to be a 
disqualifying action (thus a zero) for any potential recipient, the LPM in this analysis model 
takes account of this. Taiwan recognition showed to be difficult to implement in a logit model 
because the outcome of interest, whether aid is allocated or not, is completely separated from 
the explanatory predictor variable. This is called the problem of separation (Gelman and Hill 
2007, 104), and in the case here it is the linear predictor Taiwan recognition is completely 
aligned with the non-outcome of the dependent variables, meaning recognition of Taiwan is 
aligned with the country not receiving Chinese aid. The problem is that it is a perfect predictor 
of aid or no aid allocation from China. This problem of separation is displayed in more detail 
in the Appendix B. 
 
8.1.2. Step two: Positive aid values in pooled, random and fixed effects models 
The second step of this analysis are OLS models but only including positive aid amounts. This 
reduces the number of observations from to 773 on LPM to 471 African country-years. The 
binary Taiwan variable proved to be a problem for these models, being a perfect predictor for 
whether a country receives aid or not. Since there is no variation in this variable for countries 
that receive aid, and it does not predict how much amount aid a country receives, it is 
consequently excluded from the second series of models with the positive amounts of aid. Only 
the countries recorded in the TUFF methodology and deemed fit for research, meaning that 
years recorded but are without amount or deemed unfit for research by the Dreher et al. 2017 
are treated as NA’s. This is an assumption of the country-years not recorded are missing 
completely at random and not absent due to coding errors. Alternative solutions are to treat 
non-recorded cases as zero, which could be defended by avoiding only picking cases based on 
positive outcomes on the dependent variable. Selection on the dependent variable risk 
producing results leading the researcher to draw misplaced inferences because the cases chosen 
for the sample all share an extreme value on the phenomenon under scrutiny. In the worst-case 
scenario, this may establish relationships that do not exist in reality (Geddes 2003, 129). But 
forcing in zero values of aid on gap years is also extreme values, and this case it is a potential 
pitfall because the data does not originate from official sources. It is derived from media-based 
data collocation methodologies, which the preceding discussion about the data have made 
abundantly clear has its problems and requires being treated cautiously. The only cautious way 
to treat this variable is to use the actual positive values recorded.  
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The analysis on the positive aid values will be presented in three series of panel models, each 
using a different method: complete pooling, random effects, and fixed effects. In addition, the 
interaction test will be exclusively tested under fixed effects. To mitigate skewness issues, the 
variable has been logged. The interpretation of logged Chinese aid amounts is straightforward, 
where the natural logarithmic function on Chinese aid is being read as its percentage increase 
by a one unit increase on X.   
Pooling is a basic method of OLS. In practice it ignores the central panel data attribute of the 
data, meaning that it does not treat countries as the same observation on different years. It is 
therefore an inherent assumption that the error term is independent of the independent variables 
(Petersen 2004, 336) pooling regressions are therefore a good starting point for getting the 
sense of the effects, but inadequate for hypothesis testing. Random effects models estimate the 
regression based on the data being grouped and makes the assumption that the individual and 
idiosyncratic error terms are independent of each other. The assumption that the unmeasured 
and constant over time variables captured by the error term is independent of the values of the 
variables measures is a weakness with random effect, while an advantage is that both time-
constant effects and time-varying effects are represented (Petersen 2004, 340-341). 
Heterogeneity among recipients might also be a problem. There will always be determinants 
with the recipients not taken into account by the explanatory variables. To mitigate issues of 
this nature, the model will employ fixed (also called within) effects as the final hypothesis 
testing model, where the country effect is constant, and the effect natural resource endowment 
interacted with good governance have one foreign aid will be observed. The variation is 
therefore sacrificed for the sake of controlling for constant effects in time (Dougherty 2016, 
533-534; Petersen 2004, 338). 
 
As the purpose of this thesis is to treat the variables carefully and interpret them conservatively, 
the final model hypothesis testing model with fixed effects treats the country-specific variables 
time-invariant. Each country is treated as a group, the effect of the measured and unmeasured 
time-constant variables are represented, while the idiosyncratic error term and total error term 
of the model are assumed to be different for the measured country-specific variables (Petersen 
2004, 337). It treats the values as grouped dummies. The question with fixed effects is whether 
it is the appropriate method if there is a probable low variation at the country level over time. 
Fixed effects will take this variation away. Perspectives put to use in this framework focus on 
the determinants with African countries that often are time constant, at least within the short 
snapshot of time analyzed here. There is a debate among social scientists whether random or 
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fixed effects are the appropriate solution for panel data. Fixed effects often have been 
recommended should the coefficient at the group or country be the interesting part, while 
proponents of using random effects recommend its use if the interest is variance in the 
underlying population (Gelman and Hill 2007, 245). The worry critics have regarding the use 
of fixed effects is that it controls away heterogeneous effects and interesting variation between 
groups. These effects are harder to capture within a fixed effects model. Random effects might 
capture the variation better. Some social scientists disagree that fixed effects solve issues of 
correlation between the coefficients and residuals adequately. Bell and Jones argue that random 
effects are desirable if the researcher understands the context of the scrutinized phenomenon 
and calibrate the estimates accordingly (Bell and Jones 2014, 17; Bell, Fairbrother and Jones 
2019, 1069). Further, using fixed effects means omitting time-constant variables. But 
phenomenon corresponding with the fixed effects assumptions of long-lasting time-constant 
effects are rarely found in the social sciences. Critics worry that this dynamic misspecification 
potentially causes more bias than keeping time variance (Plümper and Troeger 2019, 42). 
Nevertheless, given that assumed normality of the estimates is out of the question with this 
data, fixed effects do the job in limiting the bias presented by skewness, potential 
autocorrelation, and large error terms. 
 
The number of biases introduced in fixed effect models are, despite everything, fewer than with 
the other models. Random effects also deploy its assumptions, for example of consistent 
exogeneity of the estimates, which fixed effects mitigate by removing the idiosyncratic means 
in the regression (Collischon and Eberl 2020, 292). And even though fixed effects might be 
disturbed by the ‘incidental parameters problem’, where a non-linear limited dependent 
variable creates consistency issues when the dataset has a substantial number of limited 
observations, solving this using random effects requires that the country effects are not 
correlated with the explanatory variables (Berthélemy 2006a, 182). Under fixed effects, the 
main source of bias is the time-varying variables that correlate with the treatment effect and 
the outcome effect over time. It imposes stricter conditions to the covariate effects and 
significance. The point of applying strict conditions here, is due to the pitfalls with the data and 
the need to be careful when applying it, which have been discussed in the concept and data 
parts. The strictest final validation for the hypotheses is therefore fixed effects for step two in 
the analysis. While not discarding significant effects under pooling and random effects, an 
association retaining significance under fixed effects are regarded as the most valid.   
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The models will be run in three rounds, first a pooled regression model, then with random 
effects, and finally the more conservative estimate with fixed effects controlling both for 
country and year differences. In addition, the interaction effect will be run in a fixed effects 
model. 
 
To answer the third hypothesis, whether China prefers poorly governed states with oil 
endowments, the fixed effects model with an interaction effect between control of corruption 
and oil abundance is presented. The theoretical framework put to use here postulates that the 
effect of petroleum abundance will be affected by governance, more precisely put that control 
of corruption will weaken a positive effect oil endowments have on a country receiving Chinese 
foreign aid. This effect is therefore interactive. The effect the main explanatory variable (X1), 
oil production, have on the outcome variable (Y), Chinese foreign aid allocation, will be 
dependent on the values of a second explanatory variable interfering (X2), control of corruption, 
in interaction with X1. This means, in the event that X2 is 0, the marginal effect on Y is X1 
(Dougherty 2016, 219).  It is important not interpreting the figures and critical values of 
interaction terms alone as unconditional effects. What is also needed is to understand the 
marginal effect of the interaction terms, even though the coefficients in the regression table 
might be insignificant. Marginal effects therefore should be visualized to fully comprehend the 
interaction term (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006, 74). 
 
 
The final part of the empirical analysis will present the same models on aid commitments from 
the DAC in total and from the United States. Since the constant on Chinese aid and the constant 
of western aid are not the same, meaning that the starting point for aid allocation, everything 
else being zero, are different to begin with. Therefore, Western aid cannot be comparable to 
Chinese aid as part of hypothesis testing. Furthermore, it is also a question of different levels 
of validity. The data from OECD Statistics are official figures as opposed to the Chinese aid 
which, as discussed, have been compiled through media-based data collection. That being said, 
the framework for the models on Chinese foreign build on conventional foreign aid allocation 
theories and expectations, mixed in with bilateral effects that are specific to Chinas foreign 
policy. The data is supposed to also be compatible with DAC allocation, and it is an appropriate 
finale of this thesis empirical analysis given that the crux of debate around Chinese aid largely 
revolves around comparing the emerging donor with the established donors. Since total DAC 
aid is multilateral, the inherently bilateral variables describing connections between individual 
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countries, like exports, have been excluded and only the recipient country-specific variables 
are applied. That is why the final model using data on US aid is introduced at the end, where 
UNGA voting alignment and export links can be introduced as well.  
 
Some parts of the data on the independent variables were missing. To solve this problem and 
avoid suffering a severe loss of observations multiple imputation methods were applied. Fully 
conditional specification, or as multivariate imputation by chained equations (MICE), as it is 
more widely called, is a data simulation method where missing values on observations are filled 
by randomly matching it with values from units whose predicted values are most similar to the 
predicted value of the missing data. There multiple iterations of this imputation method, 
meaning that it imputes the missing values several time and combine the results to land on the 
most appropriate substitute for the missing data point. With the assumption of data being 
missing at random, the mice-package and the ‘Classification and regression trees’ method were 
used for the multivariate imputation process to mitigate the missing data problem (van Buuren, 
and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011; Schenker and Taylor 1996, 425). The specifics of this 
imputation process can be found in Appendix A.  
 
The models have been tested for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. This is detailed 
further in Appendix C, with tests for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and the Hausman test 
attached. The robustness tests applied take account of these issues. The cross-section time 
series models apply robust estimators for the standard errors clustered by the dimension time. 
This White covariance matrix estimator mitigates the effects of heteroskedasticity and residual 
biasing the estimates, but it does not mean inferences can be drawn with any less care 
(Croissant and Millo 2008, 31; White 1980, 818). The robustness estimate type assumes low 




The first model will be the linear probability model with a binary Chinese aid variable. With 
the assumptions of missingness at random in mind, this will serve as an indicator for what 
determines China to allocate or give nothing at all. As mentioned, the LPM-model serves as an 
introductory component of the analysis. Following this simple presentation of dichotomous 
aid, the second step is to regress monetary amounts of aid aggregated by year on the 
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hypothesized determinants are using pooled, random, and fixed effects models. Accordingly, 
the models with the interaction of control of corruption on oil abundance will be displayed. 
Finally, the same models are used with western aid commitments flows, first from the entire 
DAC and finally from the United States. The decision to include US aid is to make a more 
precise comparison since several of the explanatory variables are bilateral in nature and DAC 
is multilateral. It would for example be meaningless to present DAC’s agreement score with 
other countries in the UN. As a reminder, the hypotheses of this thesis are summarized: 
 
H1 – Chinese aid increase after DAC assistance have decreased 
 
H2 – Chinese aid allocation is increase toward countries with abundance of oil 
endowments 
 
H3 – Chinese aid allocation decrease if countries abundant on oil endowments also have 
strong institutional quality   
 
All the models using pooled, random, and fixed effects in the second-step regression models 
using the logged positive aid amounts in 2014 USD are used in the hypothesis testing, but it is 
the coefficients retaining significance with two-way fixed effects that will be considered the 
most robust.  
 
 
9.1. Step one – Linear probability model – binary Chinese aid 
The results from the first step of the analysis, the linear probability model, are displayed in 
Table 2. It is a pooled liner model with robust standard errors taking into account the inherent 
heteroscedasticity in LPM-models. All the models have a wide layout, they will therefore be 




As can be seen on Table 2, the peculiarity of the LPM-model is apparent in that there exist 
negative probabilities. It does clearly illustrate the likelihood of receiving Chinese foreign aid 
given certain country specific determinants are significantly close to 0. The coefficient on 
Taiwan recognition is strongly negative -0.837 and highly significant on the 0.01 level, with a 
standard error of 0.58. This means that it is a -0.84 chance of receiving Chinese foreign aid if 
the potential recipient country has recognized Taiwan. Oil Production have a negative 0,000 
coefficient and is significant at the 0.05 level, making clear that the receiving Chinese aid is 
not determined by oil abundance. DAC negative growth is having a negative effect but is not 
significant. GDP per capita has effectively a zero-effect significant at the 0.05 level. While 
Control of corruption is a weak negative it is insignificant. DAC aid decrease displays a weak 
negative value and is not significant. A country being in the democracy category is not 
significant.  
 
These results serve as a clear indication of the importance of Taiwan recognition for the 
Chinese foreign aid programme. It is the only significant variable with a strong effect, the other 
two significant variables ultimately having zero effect. It seems clear that the commitment or 
non-commitment of receiving development assistance highly depends on honoring the One 
China policy, other attracting determinants like oil abundance are less important in comparison.  
The standard errors are relative to the dependent variable being dichotomous. The adjusted R-
squared of the entire LPM-model is at 22, meaning the model accounts for 22% of the variance 
of the dependent variable. To sum up, TABLE 2 shows a strong association between receiving 
Chinese and compliance to the One China policy. If a country has formal diplomatic 
connections to Taiwan, there is a strong negative linear probability that China will commit to 
allocate aid to this country. However, this does not say anything of how much aid China 
disburse to its recipients and that is what the second step in the research framework will answer 
with the positive amounts of Chinese aid.  
 
For the second part of this analysis, TABLE 3 displays Chinese aid in USD amount. These 
models use an aid amount variable that is logged to mitigate the issues of this variable’s 
skewness. Again, as a reminder, the logarithmic function of the transformed coefficients must 
be interpreted as the function of amount of Chinese foreign aid’s percentage increase, by one 
unit increase on the independent variable, all other variables being constant.  
Taiwan recognition is not in these models because it is a perfect separator, or perfect predictor, 
to receiving aid and none of the countries that received aid value recognized Taiwan. The 
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models in TABLE 3 are presented as MODEL 1 with pooling; MODEL 2 with random effects, 
MODEL 3 with fixed effects; and then finally MODEL 4 which is fixed effects with 
benchmarked Oil Production interacted with Control of Corruption. MODEL 4 therefore tests 
the third hypothesis (H3). MODEL 3 and 4 are using fixed effects and tests the residuals of the 
cross-section dependence two ways, both for country and time effects. It is the strictest model 
applied and is therefore the final model to test. Taking time trends into account is important, 
since there are several important events during this time frame that might affect the aid levels, 
like in 2002 when China officially embarks on its ‘go out’ policy, and the effects after the 2008 
financial crisis. Recalling fluctuations in FIGURE 1 that displays the total Chinese aid amount 
to Africa in years, and FIGURE 2 that displayed its variation by countries, controlling for these 





The pooled model, MODEL1, in TABLE 3, shows that the benchmarked variable Oil 
Production is significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient has a positive value of 0.927. Since 
the dependent variable is on the logarithmic scale and oil production has been transformed into 
a binary variable, this means the coefficient on average, oil production in metric tons on or 
above the 70th percentile benchmark is associated with a 152% increase in Chinese foreign aid 
holding all other variables constant. In the random effects model (MODEL 2), coefficient 
estimate is also positive at 0.883, which means that aid increased by 141% for countries above 
the oil threshold. This is significant at the 0.05 level. When fixed effects are introduced, the 
coefficient value increases but it is no longer significant. H2, which expected China to give 
more aid to oil abundant countries, holds for MODEL 1 and MODEL 2, but does not 
 hold once fixed effects are introduced.  
 
Negative DAC aid three-year growth is positive and significant for MODEL 1 and MODEL 2. 
Under random effects, if an African country’s aid commitments from the DAC have a negative 
trend in a three-year period, there is a 45% increase in Chinese aid. This effect is significant at 
level 0.10 However; this positive effect is not significant under fixed effects. H1 is confirmed 
in MODEL 1 (pooling effects) and MODEL 2 (random effects), but under fixed effects it 
appears not to be an association between Chinese aid allocation and a three-year trend of DAC 
withdrawing its activity and commitments. Control of Corruption is significant at the 0.10 level 
strongly negative in MODEL 1 and 2. Under Random effects in MODEL 2, Chinese aid is 
associated with a decrease of 46% for a one unit increase on the control of corruption index. 
This means that a country that has strong checks and balances against corruption receives less 
Chinese aid. This effect does not survive the test under fixed effects where it stays negative but 
loses significance. 
UNGA voting alignment is not significant in any of the models and has a consistently large 
standard error. Being a democracy is negative for receiving aid but not significant in any model. 
Growth in bilateral exports is consistently zero across models. GDP per capita shows now 
strong effects and is not significant on any of the models. 
Infant mortality rate is consistently negative and strongly significant at the 0.01 level across all 
models. In MODEL 3, under fixed effects the effect is even stronger than under pooling and 
random effects, and it shows that Chinese aid decrease by 5% for an increase of 1000 infants’ 
deaths in a year. It is the only significant effect in the strictest MODEL 3, and it also displays 
the lowest standard error of the variables with substantial coefficients. Even though this goes 
against expectations if one solely considers infant mortality rate as recipient need, it can also 
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be a measure for state capacity. This is an interesting and consistent finding that shows that 
China gives less aid to countries with higher infant mortality. 
In MODEL 4, the effect of oil production, corruption and their interaction are not significant. 
When control of corruption has the value zero, the positive effect 355% increase of Chinese 
aid by oil production above the threshold is not significant. As for the effect of control of 
corruption, its effect on Chinese aid allocation is -49% when oil production is zero. If the effect 
of Oil production is conditioned by control of corruption, the interaction effect is 1.218, which 
can be interpreted as a 238% increase of aid in terms of the logged dependent variable. The 
positive effect of Oil production is slightly reduced when conditioned on a recipient’s good 
governance. However, the effect is not significant, it stays positive, and it has a large standard 
error. Therefore, H3 can be rejected. To show the interaction in more detail, FIGURE 5 plots 
the marginal effect of oil production conditional on variation values of control of corruption. 
The figure shows also no significant interaction effect across the range of control of corruption, 
since confidence intervals cross zero. 
 
FIGURE 5 – Marginal effects plot of interaction effect, TABLE 3 
 
 
The plots show the difference between the base, countries below the threshold for oil 
production at value 0, and countries above the oil production threshold at value 1, over different 
levels of control of corruption. It shows how the allocation of aid changes based on different 
levels on control of corruption for oil rich countries, but this difference is not significant at any 
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level of control of corruption. The 95% confidence intervals cross zero, and are generally quite 
large. 
 
In sum, the effects in TABLE 3 are confirm the second hypothesis in MODEL 1 and MODEL 
2, but not in MODEL 3 under fixed effects. TABLE 3 has four different models. Pooled and 
random effects confirm H1 and H2, while fixed effects do not. H3 is not confirmed. MODEL 
2 random effects display the highest adjusted R-squared, accounting for 20% of the variance 
in the dependent variable. The number is negative in MODEL 3 and 4 and must be interpreted 
as zero. Given that the degrees of freedom are low, it is not a surprise the explained variance 
is low, especially when fixed effects are introduced which punish smaller N models. This is 
not uncommon when degrees of freedom are low. But as have been mentioned, these models 
are restrictive and conservative, which is important taking the model assumptions and 
discussed data limitations into account. 
 
9.2. Robustness checks 
The measure applied in the main models has so far been the benchmark of a country being on 
or above the 70th percentile in Africa in oil production in metric tons. But as discussed earlier, 
it is also appropriate to alternate the dependent variable since there are other ways to measure 
oil endowments. TABLE 4 displays the models alternating the proxy for oil abundance with 
crude oil reserves (including lease condensate) in billion barrels (equal to 42 US gallons). 
Crude oil reserves is understood as a measure of future potential oil abundance. This is also a 
binary benchmark variable with a threshold on the 70th percentile in the African countries in 
this sample (0 below this threshold and 1 at or above). TABLE 5 uses another measure of oil, 
the annual growth of Oil production value in 2014 USD in thousands. TABLE 6 applies the 
one year lagged oil rents as percentage of GDP as the estimate for oil abundance. As mentioned 
previously, this measure is the efficiency of oil extraction in a country. These alternative 











TABLE 3 showed that oil production had a positive effect on Chinese aid allocation only under 
pooling and random effects. As can be seen on TABLE 4, crude oil reserves is strongly positive 
and significant at the 0.01 level in MODEL 1 with a 171% increase if the country is above the 
70th percentile benchmark for reserves in the ground, and in MODEL 2 it shows a 157% 
increase. However, in MODEL 3 under fixed effects the positive effect weakens, and the 
significance disappears. TABLE 4 therefore does not strengthen the credibility of H2. The 
standard errors are also fairly large for the oil variable. The only other consistent significant 
effect on all four models is infant mortality rate, on MODEL 3 showing negative -5% of 
Chinese foreign aid per increase of infant deaths per 1000 in a year. Again, the explanatory 
power is best for random effects in MODEL 2. 
TABLE 5 shows that the annual change of oil production value displayed in thousands is 
positive and significant only for MODEL 1 under pooling effects, showing weak 0.01% 
increase of Chinese aid for a unit increase in production value in USD thousands amount. It 
loses significance and is even slightly negative in under fixed effects and interaction. Once 
again, infant mortality rate is consistently negative. Under fixed effects infant mortality shows 
a -5% decrease of Chinese aid allocation significant at the 0.01 level. None of the hypotheses 
are confirmed by the models in TABLE 5. 
Finally, TABLE 6 displays the one-year lagged oil rents. MODEL 1 and MODEL 2 show a 
positive and significant effect on Chinese aid. The effect is even larger and more significant 
under fixed effects: a 7% increase in Chinese aid allocation with a one unit increase in the 
difference between cost of production and value in crude oil. TABLE 6 therefore strengthens 
the credibility of H2 of the Chinese favoring oil rich African countries. It implies furthermore, 
that Chinese aid flows to African states that are efficient in their oil production. Once again, 
infant mortality rate has the significant effect of a 5% decrease of Chinese aid across all four 
models and maintains low standard errors. The explanatory power is again most promising 
under random effects. These three sets of models included alternative measures of the 
independent variable representing oil endowments. This is interesting for a number of reasons. 
With respect to H2, it shows that there is an apparent benchmark effect since crude oil reserves, 
like benchmarked oil production, had a strong significant association on aid allocation under 
pooled and random effects. Despite not being confirmed under fixed effects, there is an 
apparent association between physical weight of oil and Chinese aid allocation. On the first oil 
abundance in monetary value measure tested, the growth in annual oil value displayed no 
apparent effects. But the other monetary proxy, oil rents, has a consistently positive and 
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significant effect and confirms H2 even under the strictest conditions on fixed effects. Again, 
this implies a bias toward recipients that are oil producing and efficient in this regard.  
 
9.3. Chinese aid per capita 
A final test of the models will alternate on the dependent variable by controlling for recipient 
country population, thus transforming Chinese aid into Chinese aid per capita. As have been 
mentioned, controlling for recipient population is a common way to measure foreign aid 
alternatively. The estimates become much smaller when the number is adjusted for population, 
and it does little to mitigate the skewness of the non-transformed aid variable, which is shown 
in Appendix B. The results of the models with the dependent variable aid per capita are 
displayed on TABLE 7. Benchmarked oil production is actually strongly negative for per capita 
Chinese aid across all three models. Under fixed effects, it is actually a 97% decrease if the 
country is above the benchmark. It is not significant, maintains a large standard error. The only 
interesting effect is GDP per capita (2014 CPI) which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
and its positive effect increases from MODEL 1 until MODEL 3. Under fixed effects Chinese 
aid adjusted for the population of the recipient increases by 2% with increase in GDP per capita. 
Interestingly, infant mortality rate loses its significant effects in this model. The model 
explanatory power does not increase significantly for any of the models displaying alternative 
dependent or independent variables. again, since the skewness of the Chinese aid variable is 
not more normally distributed in this case, aid per capita is not the best way to measure Chinese 




9.4. DAC aid and American aid 
Finally, the same models will now be applied but with data from the OECD databank as 
dependent variables. As briefly explained earlier in the methodology part, the purpose of this 
is to establish comparison between Chinese foreign aid and western foreign aid with the same 
models under the same assumptions.  
The rather harsh criticism China has received has mostly originated from politicians and leaders 
in western countries, from the OECD-DAC, and from the United States government. There is 
no reason to assume absence of self-interest on the part of these actors. It is therefore 
appropriate to scrutinize aid flows from western countries in the same way Chinese aid have 
been scrutinized. 
This is done first with the logarithmic values of aid commitments from all DAC countries, and 
then the aid commitments the United States have reported to the OECD between 2000 and 
2014. The data on the independent variables and the control are the same the previous models, 
except with regard to bilateral connections on exports and UNGA voting alignment which is 
between the US and the respective Africans countries in the sample, and the binary 
conditionality is not Taiwan recognition but a country’s signing or signing-refusal to the Rome 
statues of the ICC. As with the other models, the variables with large amounts are displayed in 
thousands and as a mitigation for skewness on the aid amount variable they are logged. The 
robust standard errors clustering by the time dimension is also taken, and as part of the White 
estimates the heteroskedastic errors are also controlled for. Total DAC aid to Africa is in 







TABLE 8 shows that Oil Production benchmarked has a strong positive effect on DAC aid, 
increasing only by 182% if the recipient is above the benchmark. It is statistically significant 
at the 0.1-level. However, it only retains a significant effect for the pooled MODEL 1, not 
under random effects or fixed effects. Not surprisingly, DAC aid decrease the last three years 
shows a strong significant decrease, consistent with the three-year trend. This is included to 
display this variable’s function. Infant mortality rate has a similar effect as with Chinese aid: 
the coefficient estimate is negative and significant across all three models, showing a -0.8 
decrease under fixed effects. Control of corruption is under fixed effects significant at the 0.01 
level in MODEL 3 where total DAC aid increases with 26% with increase on the control of 
corruption index. It implies a good score on Western governance indicators is positively 
associated for receiving DAC aid. Democracy is also positive, increasing aid by 22% in 
MODEL 3 if the country is in the democratic camp. If the recipient country has signed the 
Rome Statute and recognized the ICC, under fixed effects western aid increases by 30% and is 
significant at the 0.05 level. There is also a slight significant decrease in aid allocation by unit 
increase of GDP per capita, although these effects are small, -0.002 under fixed effects. The 
adjusted R-squared is higher than the models for Chinese aid. With the benefit of OECD data 
being more reliable reported in regular intervals compared to the Chinese aid data from media 
bases data collection, it reaches 13% under fixed effects.  
 
On TABLE 9 the results of the US aid (as part of DAC) are shown with pooled, random, and 
fixed effects. In addition, MODEL 4 shows fixed effects and interaction Control of Corruption 
on benchmarked oil production. Oil production in metric tons has a strong positive association 
with US foreign aid under pooling, random, and fixed effects. On MODEL 3 it is a 75% 
increase in aid if the country is on or above the oil production benchmark. It is significant at 
the 0.10 level. On MODEL 4 Oil production has insignificant negative 34% effect on US aid 
when control of corruption is zero, and Control of Corruption has a strong positive effect of 
224% significant at 0.01 level. Interestingly, when the effect of being above the Oil production 
threshold is conditioned by the value on the control of corruption index, US aid becomes 
strongly negative with an 84% decrease, significant at the 0.01 level. This is certainly the 
opposite of what US policymakers claim to be doing in Africa. In fact, it resembles the 
relationship the west has posited for Chinese foreign aid. The marginal effects of the interaction 




FIGURE 6 – Marginal effects plot of interaction effect, TABLE 9 
 
 
FIGURE 6 shows that US foreign aid decreases for large scale oil producing countries as 
control of corruption increases. The United States does follow the allocation trends of its fellow 
OECD members, with a significant 25% decrease of US aid when there is a three-year negative 
growth trend of DAC aid. Strangely, on MODEL 4 there is decrease of US aid with a unit 
increase of UNGA voting alignment score. This implies more aid when there was bilateral 
voting alignment a year before, albeit with the similar large standard error as it had with 
Chinese aid. Being a signatory of the Rome Statue recognizing the ICC gives a strong positive 
effect with 115 % increase of US aid on MODEL 3, significant at the 0.01 level. On MODEL 
3 there is an 84% increase in aid with one unit increase on the control of corruption index, 
while democracy does not show any significant effects. Like with Chinese and total DAC aid, 
infant mortality rate is negative and significant even under strict conditions in MODEL 3, with 
negative 1.5% US aid with unit increase per 1000 infants dying. GDP per capita does show 
significant negative effect on aid, but the coefficients are small and not significant under fixed 





10. Discussion of the results and conclusion 
This analysis has tested three hypotheses regarding the determinants attracting Chinese foreign 
aid in Africa. In addition, the models tested on Chinese foreign aid has been tested on DAC 
and US aid for comparison. The results are mixed. H1 postulated an increase of Chinese aid 
with a three-year negative DAC allocation trend, which was significant in pooled and random 
effects models but not under fixed effects. H2 expected a positive relationship between Chinese 
aid and oil abundance. On benchmarked oil production there are significant and positive effects 
under pooled and random effects. The same goes for benchmarked crude oil reserves, which 
shows positive and significant effects under pooled and random effects, but not under fixed 
effects. For these two measures, on two models it implies more Chinese foreign aid is allocated 
toward countries above a threshold in oil production in metric tons and above a threshold on 
extractable oil reserves still in the ground. The measure of oil abundance that confirms H2 
across all three models is oil rents, having positive and significant associations with Chinese 
foreign aid allocation. It implies a robust and positive association between Chinese aid 
allocation and African recipient countries that are efficient in oil production. H3 proposed that 
positive effects of oil abundance will change direction and turn negative when interacted with 
control of corruption. H3 was not confirmed. The results on Chinese foreign aid, compared to 
the DAC and US foreign aid, does however have interesting empirical and theoretical 
implications in need of elaboration in the context of the three schools of thought which has 
been the guiding baseline for this research framework.  
 
10.1. Discission of the results  
10.1.1. Recipient merit  
Chinas only clear conditionality regarding Taiwan recognition was the only variable in the 
linear probability model that was significant and an effect large and apparent effect. It is not a 
determinant for Chinese aid allocation amount, but it is a decisive factor for whether an African 
recipient will receive foreign aid from China at all, showing that receiving Chinese aid has 
effectively zero probability if the recipient government still recognize Taiwan as a sovereign 
nation and consequently not honoring the One China Policy. While this is a principle of 
conditionality, aid allocation based on the policies the donor country prefers, it can also be 
argued as a factor representing self-interest. It asserts Chinas geopolitical strength compared to 
Taiwan. The aid allocation was clearly biased against the few remaining supporters of a 
sovereign Taiwan. This sends a clear message to governments that consider displaying 
idealistic stances in favor of self-determination for the Taiwanese island nation. The last 
 88 
decades has shown that China does use scare tactics and sanctions against governments or 
actors who support Taiwan’s cause or are critical of the Chinese regime. It is plausible that this 
is part of a self-interest strategy of stifling dissent in the international community.    
The echoing binary variable used to proxy recipient merit on the Western aid models was 
whether recipient countries had signed the Rome Statue recognizing the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). This proved to be a strong and significant effect across models both for DAC and 
the United States. Similar to China, Western donors prioritize countries who support their 
policies.  
 
Good governance has long been a prioritized conditionality for Western donors, and both DAC 
and the United States allocate more to recipients with better control of corruption. This effect 
was found to be strong and significant. This is in line with western claims of aid allocation and 
donor intentions, giving more to countries with the better polices under governance and 
institutional quality.  
Chinese foreign aid, on the other hand, was consistently negatively affected by increase on the 
control of corruption index, albeit not significant under the strictest test with fixed effects. If 
the fixed effects models are to be considered as a final falsifying test in the assumption of 
whether China actively favors countries significantly not well governed (or are efficient in 
combating rentierism and widespread bribery), then one accepts that China are ambivalent to 
good governance in African recipient states. This is in line with the Chinese non-interference 
policy they officially promote, that they will not condition their aid flows on governance 
indicators.  
 
As discussed in the data part, researchers should be acutely aware of governance indicators 
such as the one used here this having a western bias. On the one hand, this is problem because 
it ignores the contextual and institutional uniqueness of each recipient country and simplify it 
for quantitative scales. But on the other hand, the surveys, computation methods and conceptual 
baselines used by the World Bank do have inherent goals in uncovering private sector 
corruption and growth inhibiting patronage networks, serving as a tool for potential investors 
and governments (Gerring 2012, 186). The WDI measures have been accused of representing 
both state and private commercial interests, but equally The World Bank which possessed the 
resources to consistently systematize this data have an incentive for the indexes to be as reliable 
as possible. The validity is therefore more questionable for control of corruption when it comes 
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to Chinas preferences, because it is not a measure made by Chinese expert perceptions or 
designed with a baseline on Chinese institutions. 
 
Democracy is another conventional Western conditionality, and it fulfills the expectations in 
this analysis of not having any importance for the Chinese in Africa. The African continent is 
far from Chinese borders, the risks of democratic proliferation and spillover effects are small 
with respect to countries not close to the Chinese border, which are the cases where China 
seems to have a preference for autocracy.   
That western aid seems to be slightly biased towards democracies and countries having a larger 
degree of good institutional quality is also not surprising. The assumptions that China would 
favor countries with institutionally similar environments should apply for western countries 
also. Recipients fulfilling a democratic threshold and scores on quality of governance indices 
that are biased toward western institutional frameworks has to be considered a relatively valid 
indication of such institutional preferences based on familiarity.  
 
10.1.2. Recipient Need 
Recipient need in monetary terms, GDP per capita, only had weak effects for Chinese, DAC 
and US. Interestingly, for Chinese aid the effect was modestly positive and as the only 
significant variable when adjusting Chinese aid by recipient country population. This is hardly 
very surprising, as have been discussed few donor countries have been found to be guided by 
altruism in their aid allocation in studies integrating several schools of thought like this one.  
 
Infant mortality rate had consistently a stable negative effect on foreign aid allocation for all 
donors in this analysis. Infant mortality would be expected to have a positive effect on foreign 
aid allocation if one sees this factor as an entirely recipient need driven determinant. In that 
case, increase in more infants per thousand under the age of one dying should lead to an 
increase in aid allocation because the donors see the dire need to alleviate this. But as have 
been mentioned, infant mortality rate is also a measure for state capacity and performance of 
the social and health policies of a country. High infant mortality rate can be an indication of 
poor government efficiencies in these sectors, and consequently financial assistance is money 
unwise spent in such countries. International organizations like the OECD and the World Bank 
have in the past been known to respond to high infant mortality rates with structural adjustment 
programs and management engagement, and it has in the last decades been a recognition that 
the solutions to developing robust health care infrastructures are more tied to governance and 
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less to financial resources (Andrews 2008, 391; Shandra, Shandra and London 2012, 196). It 
can also be a reduction of OOF flows to prevent rising infant levels of mortality. Cross-country 
studies have found developing countries under high levels of debt repayment also have higher 
levels of infant mortality rates (Frey and Field 2000, 229), thus making rising infant mortality 
rates a self-fulfilling prophecy as the result of large concessional loans provided.  
 
10.1.3. Donor self-interest  
Annual growth in total bilateral exports had no effects on aid allocation, neither for China nor 
the United States. This measure applied here only captured the short-term change from one 
year to the next and did not take into account total trade or trade over longer periods of time. 
UN voting alignment was not significant with respect to Chinese aid and had consistently a 
large standard error. While this goes against certain theoretical expectations it is also important 
to remember this dyadic agreement measure was for all resolutions in a session, not limited to 
what had special priority by policymakers in Washington. It had surprisingly a negative 
association with US aid. One explanation is the problematic nature of the variable, where even 
authors Baily et al. recommends interpreting its direction very cautiously for cross-country 
time series data (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017).  
 
While a decrease in aid was significant and positive for Chinese aid allocation in some models, 
the assumption of Chinese response aid to longer trends of DAC withdrawal was never robust 
under fixed effects. Response aid does therefore not appear to be a substantial factor for 
Chinese aid allocation. A three-year reduction in foreign aid in monetary terms should certainly 
be enough time for Chinese policymaker to take note of a power vacuum, but it presupposes 
that there are attracting determinants with the recipients to begin with. Alternative ways to test 
this could be interactive models where western donors reducing their involvement in country 
due to sanctions or noncompliance with conditionalities are also recipients China have a vital 
geopolitical interest in or where ideological friendships from the Cold War persist. 
 
While oil abundance had strong positive significant effects in several of the models, their 
significance mostly dissipated under the strictest conditions with fixed effects. 
The benchmarked binary effects of oil production in metric tons and crude oil reserves in the 
ground measured in barrels had strong effects under pooling and random effects but lost 
significance under fixed effects. The change in oil value had very small effects as well.  
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The oil measure that grants most support to H2 is oil rents as percentage of GDP, showing a 
highly significant effect 7% increase of Chinese foreign aid under fixed effects. This implies 
that China could be more interested in allocating aid to recipients that are efficient in their oil 
production in monetary terms., more than simply the quantity or the oil in the ground. It does 
make sense for China to be interested in oil sector efficiency if they seek stable flows of 
petroleum imports for consumption at home.  
 
The third hypothesis aimed to test the accusations laid forward by the rogue aid thesis, but 
instead of postulating the interplay between of oil and non-democracy, the assumption was that 
governance proxied by control of corruption was important. This analysis found no evidence 
that China will allocate less to countries that are oil producing conditional on them having 
control of corruption. The effects did not change direction and were never significant. If Chinas 
interest in Africa expressed through foreign aid is oil abundance, good or poor governance does 
not seem to have an influence. 
 
Interestingly, the analysis found an association between decreasing US foreign aid and large-
scale oil production conditioned on control of corruption, after oil production had had a positive 
effect on US aid in previous models. This is however the interaction effect H3 assumes for 
Chinese aid. In other words, in this analysis US aid is more in line with the rogue aid thesis 
than the findings for Chinese aid, focusing on the effects good governance conditioning oil 
abundance have for foreign aid allocation. As Lee points, out China is relatively new in the 
global energy market and gaining substantial influence is unlikely given that the traditional 
large petroleum importers have established practice on the important oil fields and are better 
aware of the environments useful for extraction (Lee 2019, 582). If the assumption is that less 
control of corruption makes it simpler for powerful countries to take advantage of oil 
abundance in a developing country, there is no reason to assume this will not apply to the 
United States as well. The United States has a long history of supporting repressive and corrupt 
regimes that possess oil endowments, and their foreign policy have a longer history of 
cultivating such relationships through foreign aid than emerging donors like China (Taylor 
2006, 953). This association must be interpreted with care, however. There is always a danger 
of endogeneity, where oil rich countries often are not well governed, and this interferes with 
the effect. It also an important reminder, that the data for the US aid flows are more complete 
and more valid than AidData and Dreher et al (2017) tracking of Chinese flows. Comparing 
the Chinese and American models serve as an intriguing point of departure for the debate of 
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whether it legitimate at all for western countries to accuse China of being the “chief villain” 
under donor self-interest.  
 
10.2. Conclusion 
This thesis focused on the determinants of Chinese aid allocation in Africa between 2000 and 
2014. The point of departure is whether Chinese foreign aid is determined by donor self-interest 
which is what they have been accused of by the West. Running this through a two-step 
regression framework, in a linear probability model analyzing binary aid and then through 
OLS-models with aid amounts, three hypotheses under the donor self-interest assumption have 
been answered. The first clear finding is that countries recognizing Taiwan get no aid, 
suggesting Chinas one conditionality principle is vital for aid eligibility and selection. The 
thesis has found that Chinese foreign aid does bias countries performing efficiently in their oil 
production in the form of a positive association between aid allocation and oil rents. There is 
also an apparent threshold effect on oil production and crude oil reserves, though these effects 
are not confirmed under the strictest statistical tests. Chinese aid has a significant increase after 
long-term decreasing DAC aid across some models, indicating there can be interest in filling 
the vacuum after western withdrawal in some recipient countries. No findings indicate that 
China allocate less to oil abundant countries displaying good governance by having good 
control of corruption.  
This thesis argued that this assumption of rogue aid does not makes sense with regard to 
democracy in Africa, but that governance is a more important intervening factor. This argument 
has not been strengthened by the results of the empirical analysis. However, there is an effect 
when running the same models and assumptions on the United States. The US aid allocation 
decreases significantly and strongly when oil abundant countries are well governed.   
 
This thesis asked in the introduction how well Chinese foreign aid fits in a western framework 
of foreign aid allocation. The linear probability model indicates that Chinas most important 
conditionality, the recipient’s stance on Taiwan recognition, determined whether a country 
receives aid at all. Recipient merit is therefore important for Chinese aid allocation. There is 
also an association between Chinese aid and oil abundance in African countries, which suggest 
that self-interest is also partly determining their allocation. On recipient need, infant mortality 
rate had a consistently negative effect for Chinese aid allocation, as well as for western aid 
allocation, which rejects the assumption of allocation being based on recipient need.  
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The larger question is how well the conventional models explain foreign aid allocation to begin 
with. As mentioned, the schools of thought applied here are overlapping, and though Taiwan 
recognition is defined as a Chinese conditionality, suppressing Taiwan is also part of their 
foreign policy and self-interest. This can similarly be said for the west: countries displaying 
the right policies like control of corruption and recognizing the ICC means also that developing 
countries follows Euro-American institutional standards and are rewarded. As intent goes it 
cannot be isolated from self-interest. As the Chinese understand development assistance so 
differently from the west, and the theories positing aid based on self-interest has lost credibility 
over the decades, interpreting donor intentions from their allocation patterns might not be the 
universally applicable exercise as scholars have intended. China might not fit into such a 
framework at all, as they to begin with is categorized as a “new donor”, they were never a part 
of establishing the current aid system, and their development assistance resembles what 
western countries considers trade, investments, and loans. It is difficult to consider what the 
donor intent of China in Africa is, where what is clear self-interest traits by conventional 
understandings can be considered a ‘quid pro quo’-situation for China. As discussed, the 
Chinese government often assists in building roads, railways bridges, dams and refineries in 
the recipient country for the supply of oil exports. By Chinas standards, distinguishing altruism 
from opportunism might not make sense at all. Foreign aid is supposed to benefit both parties. 
Further, if Western countries berating China is guilty of the same self-interested allocation 
behaviors, one could make the argument that categorizing types of allocation into general 
frameworks is unhelpful. But there is still a logic to the framework, given the allocation patterns 
clear inclination of favoring some determinants and open disinclination towards others. Given 
that the models have displayed that Western aid also have weak associations with recipient 
need, future research on foreign aid allocation need more assumptions inspired by the realist 
school and recognize foreign aid as a foreign policy tool. This will make comparisons to so-
called rogue donors fairer and more intuitive. 
 
Future research and academic work on Chinese foreign aid need to continue working on 
improving the data due to the lack of transparent reporting from the rising power. Case studies 
and process tracing can improve and broaden the understanding of Chinese activity in Africa, 
but qualitative research should also aim to improve datasets on Chinese aid flows. China is 
becoming more ambitious at the international stage, exemplified by the belt and road initiative 
and years of US dysfunctional leadership. The shift to renewable energy sources has been a 
priority for China. Counter to ‘end of history’-paradigms also plaguing the DAC regime, liberal 
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democracy is certainly not the only game in town, and China is still admired in the developing 
world despite their disastrous handling leading up to the covid-19 pandemic. New 
developments justify more data collection and elevation in academic interdisciplinarity. China 
is becoming a major superpower, and like any superpower it extends and protects its 
geopolitical interests. Given that Chinese foreign influence will shape economics, politics, 
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Appendix A 
Data and variables 
Chinese aid (2014 deflated) 
 Chine foreign aid amount, 2014 deflated (usd_defl_2014): Deflated monetary 
 equivalent of reported monetary amount Chinese foreign aid (ODA-like + OOF-like + 
 Vague official) in reported currency to 2014 U.S. Dollars  
Crude oil reserves 
 Crude oil including lease condensate reserves (billion barrels) "Crude oil reserves, in 
 billions": A reserve is that portion of the demonstrated reserve base that is estimated to 
 be recoverable at the time of determination. The reserve is derived by applying a 
 recovery factor to that component of the identified coal resource designated as the 
 demonstrated reserve base. A barrel unit of volume equal to 42 U.S. gallons. 
Oil Production 
 Oil production in metric tons (ross_oil_prod): Oil production in metric tons.  
Oil value (2014 dollars) 
 Oil production value in 2014 dollars (ross_oil_value_2014): Oil production value in 
 2014 dollars.  
Oil rents 
 Oil rents (% of GDP) (wdi_oilrent): Oil rents are the difference between the value of 
 crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production.  
Infant mortality rate 
 Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) (wdi_mortinf): Infant mortality rate is the 
 number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given 
 year.  
Democracy dichotomous 
 Dichotomous democracy measure (bmr_dem): Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous 
 Coding of Democracy, 1800-2010. This data set provides a dichotomous coding of 
 107 
 democracy from 1800 until 2015, however QoG data contains information from 1946 
 onwards. Authors define a country as democratic if it satisfies conditions for both 
 contestation and participation. Specifically, democracies feature political leaders 
 chosen through free and fair elections and satisfy a threshold value of suffrage  
Control of corruption 
 Control of Corruption, Estimate (wbgi_cce):  “Control of Corruption” measures 
 perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for 
 private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs 
 somewhat, ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done”, to 
 the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” 
 in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state capture”.  
GDP per capita (2014 CPI) 
 GDP at current prices: Gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices is GDP at prices 
 of the current reporting period. From the United Nations  Statistics Division. 
 Variable adjusted for inflation by author, using Percent Change  from Preceding 
 Period, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate. BEA Account Code:  A191RL 
UNGA, voting agreement score 
 Score for voting alignment in UN General Assembly (Agree): Voting similarity index 
 between ccode1 and ccode2 in a given session – computed using 3 category vote data 
 (1 = “yes” or approval for an issue; 2 = abstain, 3 = “no” or disapproval for an issue.) - 
 Abstention is counted as half-agreement with a yes or no vote. Vote choice: 1 – Yes, 2 
 – Abstain 
Taiwan recognition 
 1 – country recognize Taiwan 
 0 – country does not recognize Taiwan 
DAC Total Aid commitments 
 Aid commitments to countries and regions [DAC3a]: A commitment is a firm written 
 obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or 
 availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under 
 specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a 
 recipient country or a multilateral agency. DAC total aid commitments (2019 USD) is 
 an aggregated figure of Commitments consisting of ODA and OOF activities like 




 Export (US$ Thousand): China Exports to Africa in 2018 US$ Thousand. WITS-
 Comtrade provides bilateral import/export trade value in thousands of US dollar. 
 





















        
11.76 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 2,10 0.00 
 































Boxplot of separation Taiwan recognition and Chinese foreign aid amount 
 
Boxplot over distribution of Taiwan recognition and Chinese foreign aid (binary) 
 
Table showing binary separation 
X= Taiwan recognition Binary value   
Y = Chinese foreign aid (binary)   0 1 
Binary value    
  0 118 75 
























Studentized Breusch-Pagan Test against Heteroskedasticity – TABLE 3 
Model: Logged Chinese aid amount ~ oil production benchmarked 
BP estimate = 8.7041 
df = 8 
p-value = 0.3679 
 
Hausman Test for Panel Models – TABLE 3 
Data: Chinese aid amount ~ oil production benchmarked 
Model: Random effect MODEL 2, Fixed effects MODEL 3 
chisq = 19.541 
df =  8 
p-value = 0.01222 
 
VIF: Variance Inflation Factor – Variation inflation factors of all predictors – TABLE 3 
Oil Production t-1, 
benchmark 






1.200981 1.044697 1.015666 1.022058   
Control of corruption Democracy 
dichotomous 
Infant mortality rate GDP per capita (2014 
CPI), 
 1.621849 1.161011 1.573353 1.254006 
 
 
